Buffalo Human Rights Law Review
Volume 22

Article 6

4-1-2016

Justice in Dire Straits: Unlawful Pretrial Detainees, Family
Members and Legal Remedies
Danushka S. Medawatte
University of Colombo

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bhrlr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Immigration Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Danushka S. Medawatte, Justice in Dire Straits: Unlawful Pretrial Detainees, Family Members and Legal
Remedies, 22 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 189 (2016).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bhrlr/vol22/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Human Rights Law Review by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

JUSTICE IN DIRE STRAITS:
UNLAWFUL PRETRIAL DETAINEES, FAMILY
MEMBERS AND LEGAL REMEDIES
Danushka S. Medawattet
INTRODUCTION

The U.S. criminal justice system has been under attack for its overuse
of pretrial detention and its indifference to the presumption of innocence in
recent decades. The judiciary is often critiqued for its discriminatory practices in this regard and this Article highlights how certain detentions can
become 'unlawful' due to, inter alia,judicial biases. While academic literature pertaining to legal rights of detainees abound, there is a dearth of literature which ascertains the rights and remedies of the family members who
are affected. The definitional scope of a family member is analyzed with
reference to the circumstances in which they can be regarded as 'indirect'
victims possessing locus standi to claim rights and remedies for the illegality of the detention that is suffered by the detained individual.
This Article argues that, during the interim period when the legality of
the detention remains questionable, it is imperative that family members be
granted the right to conjugal visits and the right to spend recreational time
with the detainee. The immediacy of the granting of these rights is demanded due to the irreparability of loss that would arise in cases of unlawful pretrial detention. I also argue that, in addition to the detainee, family
members should be entitled to compensation in the event the court determines the detention to be unlawful. I explore the further possibility of extending the right of compensation to family members who reside outside the
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territorial boundaries of the U.S. The jurisprudential basis for these arguments is drawn from the decisions of national courts, the Human Rights
Committee and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
I.
A.

OVERVIEW AND SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE

Overview

The contemporary ideology of international human rights law (IHRL)
requires every individual to be treated with dignity.' Yet norms such as the
presumption of innocence and justice seem to have lost their historical glory
in light of laws pertaining to pretrial detention. 2 The legal systems of many
countries have turned the proverbial blind eye especially to the societal impact created by unduly long periods of pretrial detention advocated for by
their respective criminal justice systems. 3 In this Article, I analyze pretrial
detentions that take place in the United States of America and their effects
on the family members of the detainee. Primarily, I question whether pretrial detention becomes unlawful in certain circumstances and, if answered
in the affirmative, I identify whether such circumstances give rise to (a)
violation(s) of rights of family members of the detainee. For the purposes of
this Article, I adopt a narrow definition of family members and argue that
they can be regarded as indirect victims of unlawful pretrial detentions. I
also argue that the State can be held responsible within the international
1. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl., G.A. Res. 217A (III),

U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, pmbl., Dec. 10, 1984,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pmbl., Mar. 23,
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, pmbl., Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.

2.

OPEN

Soc'y

TRIAL DETENTION

FOUNDS., PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: THE GLOBAL OVERUSE OF PRE-

95 (2014).

3. On a comparative note, if the ECHR is referred to for its jurisprudence on pretrial detention, it is evident that 'unduly' long periods of pretrial detentions are generally considered as violations of both the rights of the detainee and the family members
of the detainee. However, in Ereren v. Germany, the court unanimously held that a 5year duration of pretrial detention on grounds of suspicion for the detainee's connection
with regard to terrorist offences committed in Turkey, possession of forged identity
papers and his risk of collusion and absconding was not a violation of liberty. This
decision was reached on the ground that the delays were "primarily caused by the difficulties of gathering evidence..." and that the "continued detention was subject to repeated review," and therefore the State party could not be held liable. 67522/09 Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 12, 13 (2014).
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human rights framework to provide remedies to the family members who
are adversely affected by unlawful pretrial detentions.
While literature on pretrial detention abounds, there is a dearth of
scholarship pertaining to the rights of individuals, other than the detainee,
which are affected directly by pretrial detention. 4 This Article does not analyze preventive detention resulting from national security concerns. Even if
the pretrial detentions that I analyze are drawn from the criminal justice
system of the U.S., I explore the possibility of drawing from IHRL principles to substantiate my claim that family members of the detainees are entitled to rights and remedies.
In anticipation of the criticism that provision of rights to family members of the detainee may undermine the latter's rights, I refer to publications
such as 'Inside Looking Out' 5 'The Socioeconomic Impact of Pretrial De7
tention', 6 'Presumption of Guilt: The Global Overuse of Pretrial Detention'
and 'The Presumption of Innocence: Evidential and Human Rights Perspectives'. 8 All of these publications evidence the fact that detainees consider
constant interaction with their family members necessary for two reasons:
(a) to maintain mental stability and mental health of the detainee, and (b) to
lessen the impact on the family members, especially the impact on children.
I argue that the spouse/partner of the detainee should have the right to con4. See generally Andre T. Guzman, Human Rights Backsliding, 102 CAL. L. REV.
603 (2014); Pollina Levina, Links between Criminal Justice Procedure and Torture:
Learningfrom Russia, 16 New Crim. L. Rev. 104 (2013); Megan Schuba, The Fourth
or Fourteenth? UntanglingConstitutionalRights in PretrialDetention Excessive Force
Claims, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1159 (2010); Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1009 (2013).
5. JAMIE S. MARTIN, INSIDE LOOKING OUT: JAILED FATHERS' PERCEPTIONS ABOUT

(2001). In this book, the author has included excerpts from interviews that he conducted with convicted inmates. Although this article
is on pretrial detainees, the emotions and difficulties that one experiences when parted
from families cannot be said to be drastically different merely because the method of
detention differs. Martin's research shows how the absence of the father has had a
negative impact on the children as well as how the lack of interaction or minimum
interaction with the children have led to immense psychological pressure on the detainees. Therefore, to argue that the family members should be allowed to interact more
with the pretrial detainees is not to be interpreted as a sidelining of the rights of the
detainee but to be regarded as being complimentary to the other rights that are provided
to pretrial detainees in general.
6. OPEN Soc'y FOUNDS., THE SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION
(2011).
7. OPEN Soc'y FOUNDS., supra note 2.
SEPARATION FROM THEIR CHILDREN

8.

ANDREW STUMER, THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE: EVIDENTIAL AND HUMAN

RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES

(2010).
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jugal visitation; the right to spend time in recreational activities with the
pretrial detainee; and be eligible in addition to the detainee, to receive compensation from the State when a pretrial detention has been determined by a
court to be unlawful. Other than the right to compensation, the other two
rights that I propose in the Article are to be conferred on the pretrial detainee and the family members during the interim period when a case has
been filed questioning the legality of the pretrial detention. These rights are
to be provided in addition to other rights that pretrial detainees are eligible
for and none of these rights are to be interpreted in a manner detrimental to
the rights that are already made available to pretrial detainees.
In order to substantiate my claim that family members are entitled to
various rights and remedies when a related individual has been taken into
pretrial detention that is determined to be unlawful, I examine various other
aspects pertaining to criminal justice and IHRL. In the characterization of
the rights of family members of the detainee, varying perceptions towards
the presumption of innocence and IHRL are important. Particularly the
works of Shima Baradaran 9 and the Open Society Foundation' 0 indicate the
connection of the presumption of innocence with due process, resultant impacts of the global overuse of pretrial detention and human rights violations
linked thereto. Stumer's The Presumption of Innocence'" indicates how the
very existence of the concept of presumption of innocence in the criminal
justice system has created an imbalance between the requirements of protecting the defendants and protecting the community interests. He argues
that the inability of states to strike a balance between presumption of innocence in favor of unconvicted detainees and requirements of society have
led to the narrowing of the presumption of innocence to the detriment of the
pretrial detainees. 12 To the extent that this Article attempts to establish the
notion that non-consideration of the presumption of innocence in any singular case results in the violation of family member rights, I disregard the
broad vernacular meaning attached to the phrase presumption of innocence
by international human rights advocates in favor of the narrow meaning
13
attributed to the phrase in U.S. Constitutional Law.

9. Shima Baradaran, The Presumptionof Punishment, 8 CRIM. L. & PHILO. 391,
391 - 406 (2014).
10. See generally OPEN Soc'y FOUNDS., supra note 2.
11. STUMER, supra note 8.
12. Id.
13. I am thankful to Professor G. L. Neuman for drawing my attention to this
argument.
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Scope of the Article

This Article treats the issue of unlawful detention as a ground to justify
the search for remedial measures to compensate any human rights violation
suffered by family members of a detainee. Although I define the term 'family members' narrowly, I do not foreclose the possibility of the rights advocated for in this Article to be applied to 'other' categories of family
members that transcend the traditional definitions of family. Moreover, I
do not rule out other rights that the family members should be entitled to,
although I limit my analysis to three chosen basic rights.
There are many reasons that cause a detention to be unlawful. Delaying trial is one mechanism through which a detention could convert to an
unlawful detention. One goal of this Article is to emphasize the aspiration
of achieving liberal legality through the implementation of existing laws to
shorten the duration of pretrial detention.' 4 I argue, with reference to case
law, existing literature and comparative practices of other states and the
decisions of international bodies that altering the period of pretrial detention
can contribute to the protection of the rights of the family members as well.
Such changes are possible if the state adopts measures to incorporate IHRL
into domestic law. However, such incorporation does not come easily and
there are factors that affect such incorporation. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink
name that possibility the 'spiral model of human rights.' 5 Using the spiral
model, they propound that states will transform into more human rightsfriendly jurisdictions with the passing of time.' 6 This model indicates the
possibility of achieving policy changes pertaining to pretrial detention,
which creates the possibility of reimagining the whole framework. 17 By
adopting a measure similar to the spiral - model of human rights, a state
8
can effectively address the inefficiencies of its criminal justice system.'
Using this approach, I argue it is possible to provide remedies to family
members of the detainee even though they are indirect victims and the
criminal justice system has no precedent in providing human rights reme14. Although the duration of the detention is insufficient to convert it into an unlawful pretrial detention, there is a common understanding, also shared by the HRC,
that it is safer to have a cap on the maximum duration of pretrial detention. See Hum.
Rts. Comm., List of issues in relation to the fourth periodic report of the United States
of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/Q/4 (Jul. 5, 2013).
15. See generally, THOMAS RISSE, STEPHEN C. RoPP & KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE
PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE

16.

THOMAS RISSE, STEPHEN

C. RoPP &

(2013).

KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE POWER OF

HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE

10 (1999).

17. This model is analyzed in further detail in Section III.D.1. of this Article.
18. RIssE ET AL., supra note 15, at 8.
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dies in such circumstances. Consequently, I further propose that the state
should be held liable to provide the rights advocated for in this Article immediately pursuant to the legality of the detention being questioned in a
court of law. 19 In the segments that follow, I analyze at length the underlying reasons for such a proposition.
This Article further argues that criminal justice system overlaps economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights of the individuals involved.
As a result, the state should consider such impacts when determining the
,reasonability' of pretrial detention. While this Article acknowledges pretrial detention is necessary to ensure justice, it moves beyond conventional
parameters by propounding that the state should apply IHRL to ascertain
the rights of family members.
A transition from Criminal Justice to IHRL results when the law requires state to consider the above-mentioned impacts. This is one form of
transformation of law. However, when the law demands that a state should
consider the impact on the family members as well, a different transformation occurs. This transformation is the law's ability to encapsulate larger
frameworks within reach. This transformative possibility of law holds significance in the context of the Article as the arguments are tendered on the
hypothesis that the legal system does not necessarily have to be limited to
the alleged victim and the offender/violator of rights/or responsible institution. The long arms of justice could reach the family members of the detainees and provide them the remedies that they deserve for the unaccounted
loss they suffered due to unlawful pretrial detention.
The rights and remedies that I argue for in this Article are based on the
presumption that the family members of the detainee possess locus standi to
raise claims regarding the legality of pretrial detention. The presumption
further identifies that the family members are entitled to raise claims regarding the individual suffering they have experienced. One limitation concerning the aforementioned presumption is that I will not delve into
academic debates as to whether family members should or should not have
locus standi to bring such claims while the detainee is also entitled to bring
similar claims. For purposes of analysis it is sufficient to assume that the
family members retain a right to bring a claim before the courts. Such a
right can be defended on the basis that the family members should have an
independent claim they can resort to in the event that conditions of detention prevent the direct victim from effectively pursuing his or her rights.

19. The immediacy is necessary as the non-provision leads to irreparable damages
to the family members.
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C. Structure of the Article
This Article is comprised of five substantive parts. The first part introduces the main themes. The second part primarily seeks to ascertain the
definitional scope of the phrases 'unlawful pretrial detention' and 'family
member.' The third part explores the conceptual, political and legal contexts that give rise to the rights that can be invoked for the protection of the
family members of a detainee in case of an unlawful pretrial detention. The
fourth part explores the connection between family members and the detainees by laying down a framework to consider family members' victims
under IHRL who bear rights that can be enforced by resorting to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or other international covenants. The fifth part contains an analysis of rights and remedies
that the family members are entitled to if and when the detainee is a victim
of an unlawful detention and the family member falls within the definition
given herein while also falling into the category of indirect victims which is
analyzed in the fourth part.
This Article concludes by advancing the position that the extension of
rights is possible within the existing legal system when the legal system is
looked at as an integral whole which overlaps with many areas of social
life, rather than perceiving it in dissected segments that run parallel to one
another. Moreover, the analysis indicates there is a possibility of extending
certain rights (such as the right to compensation), in selected circumstances,
to family members of a detainee even if they reside outside the territory of
the U.S.
D.

MethodologicalApproach of the Article

The methodological basis of this Article is drawn from the jurisprudence of recognized international organizations such as the Human Rights
Committee (HRC) and treatises of scholars who view international law as a
repository, which helps enrich domestic law. The influence of institutions
such as the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IACHR) and the HRC
are referred to in this Article as authoritative institutions in setting or shaping the domestic debate on the extension of rights to family members of a
detainee on pretrial detention claims. Several decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) are referred to in situations where comparative analysis is required. Employing philosophical debates underpinning IHRL, I engage in an evaluation of contemporary moral, political and
societal debates that alter the perceptions pertaining of international law,
which enable me to reimagine the rights of family members of detainees.
The underlying theme of this Article is that the domestic legal system
should use IHRL to shape unfavorable pretrial detention laws and practices

[Vol. 22
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into acceptable norms that fall within the scope of due process. The theme
is based on Professor Joseph Raz's statement that this moment in time is
opportune for human rights discourse as "claims about. . . rights are used
more widely in the conduct of world affairs than before. '20 This 'persistent
power' 2 1 of IHRL is integrated into this Article's methodological approach
to justify the reasons for incorporating IHRL into the U.S. criminal justice
system.
II.

DEFINITIONAL CHALLENGES AND IMPACTS OF PRETRIAL
DETENTIONS

A.

Definition of 'Unlawful' PretrialDetention

In the context of this Article, the issue arises with regard to 'unlawful'
or 'wrongful' pretrial detention as opposed to pretrial detention in general.
Nevertheless, this calls for a definition of what pretrial detention encapsulates in general. I note at the outset that the Tokyo Rules emphasize that
pretrial detention should only be used as a last resort in any situation22 and
the trial should commence at the earliest possible opportunity.
Unlawful pretrial detention has previously been defined as a situation
where the detainee's trial is unduly delayed, or where the detainee has very
low or no expectations of being presented for a trial due to the preventive
detention policy adopted by the state in respect to certain national or social
concerns such as the criminal justice system. 23 Scholars contend that forming a standard definition for pretrial detention is difficult due to differences
in the legal systems and because of different purposes for which pretrial
detention is used. 24 The other issue that arises is the use of interchangeable
20. Joseph Raz, Human Rights Without Foundations,in THE PHILOSOPHY
321, 321 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010).

OF IN-

TERNATIONAL LAW

21. See generally RISSE ET AL., supra note 15.
22. Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures (The Tokyo Rules),
G.A. Res. 45/110, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/110, 6.1 (Dec. 14, 1990).
23. Compare Deborah N. Pearlstein, Detention Debates, Ito MICH. L. REV. 1045
(2012) (reviewing BENJAMIN WITTES, DETENTION AND DENIAL (2011)), and Stella
Burch Elias, Rethinking Preventive Detentionfrom a Comparative Perspective: Three
Frameworksfor Detaining Terrorist Suspects, 41st COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 99
(2009), with PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW (Andrew Ashworth, Lucia

Zedner & Patrick Tomlin eds., 2013) (analyzing preventive practices of the States to
portray how such practices result in state intervention in the lives of the individuals).
24. Piet Hein Van Kempen, Pre-TrialDetention in National and International
Law and Practice:A Comparative Synthesis and Analyses, in
AND

PENITENTIARY

FOUNDATION,

PRETRIAL

DETENTION:

INTERNATIONAL PENAL

HUMAN

PROCEDURAL LAW AND PENITENTIARY LAW, COMPARATIVE LAW

RIGHTS, CRIMINAL

7 (2012).
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terms such as 'remand in custody' or 'preventive detention.' 25 This difference occurs mainly due to the multitude of national enactments used in
different states. 26 The French legal system uses the phrase 'd6tention
provisoire' and the Spanish legal system uses the phrase 'la prisi6n preventiva.' While the French term indicates the imprisonment is provisional, i.e.
with the possibility of being changed later, the Spanish term literally interpreted indicates a preventive incarceration, which could even be interpreted
as being indefinite. The differences evident in usage could thus create confusion regarding what is truly meant by the term 'pretrial detention.' However, in ordinary terms, pretrial detention can be defined as the "detaining
27
of a person before he is found guilty of a crime.
It is questionable as to what could constitute an 'undue' delay of a
trial. As it is a concept where the concept of reasonability comes into play,
ascertaining a number of days after which detention becomes unlawful is
impossible. Such an approach is open to criticism and would not hold sway
due to the differences in the nature of diverse crimes for which individuals
are detained prior to trial.
In United States v. Gallo, Judge Weinstein stated that "any pretrial
detention of more than 90 days exceeds what Congress contemplated, and a
pretrial detention of more than six months should flash a warning that a
violation of due process has probably occurred. ' 28 Although detention lasting for a particular number of days does not indicate an inherent unlawful25. PRETRIAL DETENTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 55 (A.M.Van Kalmthout,
M.M.Knapen & C. Morgenstern eds., 2009); see also the opinion of Judge Sergio Garcfa Ramfrez in Lopez Alvarez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Ser. C No. 141,
IHRL 1525 18 (2006) (Judge Sergio Garcia Ramirez points out how preventive detention can turn into a violation of human rights: "preventive detention [is one] of the most
severe of the precautionary measures still used in criminal trials, since it implies a
profound restriction to freedom, with very important consequences. We normally state
that the preventive detention is not a real sanction; it is not a punitive measure, but
instead simply a precautionary and ephemeral one. Technically, this is true. However,
considering this phenomena in the light of reality -even when it comes up against the
technicality-preventive detention does not differ at all, except in its name, of the punitive detention: both are a deprivation of freedom, they (normally) occur in terrible conditions, they cause the subject and those that surround him a serious material and mental
damage, and they normally have long-term repercussions, sometimes devastating");
Elizabeth A. Jenkins, Preventive Detention in the United States of America: Legal and
Practical Dimensions, UNIV. OF. FLA. LAW (2010) http://www.law.ufl.edu/_pdf/academics/centers/cgr/l Ithsconference/ElizabethJenkinsPreventativeDetention in_
theUS.pdf.
26. See PRETRIAL DETENTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 25, at 55.
27. See OPEN Soc'y FOUNDS., supra note 2, at 7.
28. 653 F. Supp. 320, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

ness in the pretrial detention, I agree that the length of the detention could at
least be considered a warning that due process has been violated. However,
this case was distinguished in United States. v. Stanford29 with reference to
United States v. Salerno30 in that the court differentiated between punitive
and regulatory detention. According to this line of cases, the latter is considered lawful while the former is not. Hence, the current principle is that
the mere duration of detention would not suffice to consider it an unlawful
pretrial detention. In addition to undue delay, other circumstances such as
police officers lying to or misleading the prosecutors; failing to disclose
exculpatory evidence, or unduly pressuring the prosecutor to seek an indictment, are other circumstances have given rise to unlawful pretrial
31
detention.
1. Presumption of Innocence
Interpretation and application of the presumption of innocence in the
U.S. becomes important in my attempt to define unlawful detention. While
18 U.S.C. § 3142 (j) reaffirms the applicability of the presumption of innocence, the level of discretion granted to judicial officers in determining the
same could result in discriminatory or unreasonable pretrial detentions. The
opportunities available for subjective judgments as to whether a suspect
ought to be detained prior to trial is evident in the wording of § 3142 (g) (3)
(A) which inter alia considers the "person's character, physical and mental
condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence
in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or
alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court
proceedings" in making the decision. According to the human rights approach that is argued for in this Article, the elements mentioned above are
characteristics that the court should consider in determining whether an individual should remain in pretrial detention. Accordingly, these characteristics may help determine the individual's innocence and flight risk. If
resorted to in an effective manner, the rule mentioned herein coupled with
the adoption of the 'fair balance test' 32 should lead to a reduction in arbitrary and unlawful pretrial detention. Although several aspects of the section are worthy of deference, making a detention decision, and determining
the length of such decision based on employment and financial resources
29. 722 F.Supp. 2d 803, 808-09 (S.D. Tex. 2010).

30. 107 S.Ct. 2095 (1987).
31. Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647-48 (4th Cir. 2012). The Evans decision
also complies with 42 USCA §1983. Id. But see Julian v. Hanna, 732 F.3d 842, 846 (7th
Cir. 2013) (declining to follow the Evans decision).
32. This test is analyzed in detail in Section IV.B.2.
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for instance could lead to discriminatory results.33 Moreover, factors such as
flight risk and the nature of the crime alone should not determine the neces34
sity of holding an individual in pretrial detention.
2.

Arrests and Violations of Due Process

The pretrial detention process generally commences with the arrest of
an individual. Either a suspect or a person charged directly with a crime can
be arrested. This essentially means that a person does not necessarily have
to be charged with a crime in order to be arrested. 35 In some such cases
there is a possibility of the detention becoming an unlawful detention.
Many international instruments contain provisions relevant to detentions in general. Some such instruments are the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons
under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (Body of Principles), 36 the
International Covenant on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances 37 and United Nations Principles on the Effective Prevention
38
and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions.
These instruments are relevant in that the provisions of such instruments are
useful in changing the domestic legal system to be more norm-compliant
and responsive to the rising needs of society.
In the domestic context, it has been identified that most unlawful pretrial detentions generally result from problems in the criminal justice system or immigration laws. 39 In light of the fact that the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) has reiterated the injustice created by wrongful deprivation of
liberty and condemned it as a violation of fundamental international legal
instruments, pretrial detention ought to be taken as a serious issue of human
rights. One must pay greater attention to pretrial detention especially when
33. See also OPEN Soc'Y FOUNDS., supra note 6, at 12 (arguing that people from
poorer backgrounds suffer more than individuals from a richer background).
34. See, e.g., Piruzyan v. Armenia, http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 20,
2015); Muller v. France, http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
35. KALMTHOUT ET AL., supra note 25, at 4.
36. G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/Res/43/173 (Dec. 9, 1988).
37. Dec. 20, 2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3.

38. G.A. Res. 44/159, 82nd Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/159 (Dec. 15,
1989).
39. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Criminal Law and Immigration Law: Defining
the Outsider: I. CriminalLaw, Immigration Law, and the Noncitizen: Undocumented
Criminal Procedure,58 UCLA L. REV. 1543 (2011); Thomas H. Cohen, PretrialDetention and Misconduct in Federal District Courts, 1995 - 2000, BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT.

(Feb. 2013) http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4595.
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unwarranted levels of discretion play an important role in detention deci40
sions as shown above.
In light of the foregoing analysis, by using the phrase 'unlawful pretrial detention,' I refer to detentions made subjectively without resort to
objective criteria, detention with unduly delayed trials, violations of rule of
law, inhumane conditions prevalent in detention centers, and the continua41
tion of detention even once the reasons for detention have been eradicated.
B.

Definition of 'Family Members'
1. Modem Conceptualization of 'Family Members'

Using the phrase 'family members of the detainee' as a generic phrase
is as problematic as it is inherently vague. Furthermore, lack of consensus
as to what constitutes a family makes it a difficult phrase to define. One
main question that arises, therefore, is whether it refers to different categories of family members such as ascendants, descendants and dependents.
Could this definition then be extended to such relatives notwithstanding
their dependency on the detainee for sustenance? If such a limitation were
to be drawn, would that result in further limitation of parties to official legal
relationships such as marriages? 42 This gives rise to the next issue: whether
partners of civil unions, homosexual partners and concubines are included
in the definition. In addition to these, it must also be ascertained whether
any definition arrived at could be extended to such family members who
reside outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.
This Article does not analyze whether the definition of 'family members' should be restricted to the traditional matrimonial unions of heterosexual partners and their children. The general presumption on which this
40. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 553, 573 (May 24, 1980); see also Martin Schoenteich, Why
the Overuse of PretrialDetention is an Overlooked Human Rights Crisis, OPEN SOC'Y
FOUNDS.

(Sep. 12, 2014), http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/why-overuse-

pretrial-detention-overlooked-human-rights-crisis.
41. See generally PRISONS IN THE AMERICAS

IN THE TWENTY - FIRST CENTURY:

A

HUMAN DUMPING GROUND (Jonathan D. Rosen & Martin W. Brienen eds., 2015) (criti-

quing the current penitentiary practices for various reasons including the overuse of
pretrial detention and the prison conditions that exist; further critiquing the unduly long
pretrial detentions and indicates that such pretrial detentions could transform into unlawful pretrial detentions.
42. See Hartford Ins. Co. v. Cline, 139 P.3d 176, 178 (N.M. 2006) (holding the
exclusion of domestic partners from an automobile insurance policy was not invalidated
as contrary to public policy because there was no express statutory language in New
Mexico covering domestic partners within the definition of family members).
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analysis is based is that family members should be inclusive of partners of
heterosexual, homosexual and transsexual unions. 43 However, lack of empirical data on how pretrial detention affects non-traditional unions compels
me to restrict the analysis to the impact of unlawful pretrial detentions on
traditional families. It is also important to note that the HRC, in General
Comment (GC) 19 has explained that states can determine who should be
included within the definition of family in accordance with their respective
culture. 44
One of the main connections between unlawful pretrial detention and
the family members of a detainee is that the family nexus is immediately
affected by the detention. 45 This inevitably affects family members in the
socioeconomic paradigm. The tragic result of the draconian overuse of pretrial detention is found to be more disadvantageous to those who come from
poorer backgrounds. 46 One of the reasons that undergird such high pretrial
47
detention rates among the poor is their inability to, inter alia, afford bail.

43. Lack of egalitarianism in recognizing same sex unions can create far-reaching
consequences in terms of the rights of family members that I advocate for in this Article. The process has dialectically been slow prior to 2004 until the Courts of the State of
Massachusetts ruled that same sex couples can marry. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). There has been gradual development since
then. Following United States v. Windsor, many states recognize same sex marriages as
legal. 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
44. As the comment provides "[t]he Committee notes that the concept of the family may differ in some respects from State to State, and even from region to region
within a State, and that it is therefore not possible to give the concept a standard definition. However, the Committee emphasizes that, when a group of persons is regarded as
a family under the legislation and practice of a State, it must be given the protection
referred to in Article 23. Consequently, States parties should report on how the concept
and scope of the family is construed or defined in their own society and legal system.
Where diverse concepts of the family, "nuclear" and "extended," exist within a State,
this should be indicated with an explanation of the degree of protection afforded to
each. In view of the existence of various forms of family, such as unmarried couples
and their children or single parents and their children, States parties should also indicate
whether and to what extent such types of family and their members are recognized and
protected by domestic law and practice." International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Art. 23, Gen. Comment 19 (July 27, 1990), http://ccprcentre.org/doc/ICCPR/
General%20Comments/HRI.GEN. I.Rev.9%28Vol.I%29_%28GC 9%29_en.pdf.
45. OPEN Soc'y FOUNDS., supra note 6, at 1I.
46. See id. at 1I- 12.
47. In addition to bail, the author also refers to the inability of the detainee to
'bribe' or afford a 'barrister'. Id.

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

2. Legislative Impact and Importance
A comprehensive analysis of the implications arising from federalstate political interdependence and independence is required when evaluating the definition of 'family members.' It suffices for the purposes of this
Article to employ a representative segment of such legislative enactments.
It is undisputed that "there has long been conflict over the relationship between the states and the federal system vis-a-vis the family. '48 Harbach
argues that 'family' is essentially regarded as a state matter in terms of
subject matter jurisdiction. 49 This, however, is not necessarily true in terms
of pretrial detention and the criminal justice system in the U.S. because the
federal rules pertaining to pretrial detention result in family matters indirectly being converted to federal matters.
In domestic jurisprudence, there are several statutes and documents,
which refer to 'family.' The Model Penal Code (MPC) of the American
Law Institute (ALl), which has greatly influenced the criminal justice of the
U.S., does not define what constitutes a family. However, it contains references to substantive offences against families. Many states, which have
adopted the MPC in whole or part, have also abstained from defining the
term 'family.' 50 Although the criminal justice system lacks an authoritative
definition of the phrase 'family members,' there are other legislative definitions of the term at federal, state and zonal levels.
Legislative bodies in certain states have sought to emphasize the importance of residing in one housing or living unit for purposes of being
considered a family. For instance, the Florida Statute on Proceedings Relating to Children defines family as "a collective body of persons, consisting
of a child and a parent, legal custodian, or adult relative, in which: (a) the
persons reside in the same house or living unit."'5' Domestic Relations Law
(hereinafter DRL) concerning marriage and child custody also defines 'family member' as "a spouse, including a former spouse, a grandparent, a parent, a child, a stepchild, or any other person living in the same
52
household."
For purposes of employment law, The Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) states the definition of an individual as a member of the 'immediate
family' does not depend on whether he is related by blood or marriage.
48. Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a FederalQuestion?, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 131, 131 (2009).
49. See id. at 134.
50. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-14 (West 2006); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10 (McKinney 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (LexisNexis, 2010).
51. FLA. STAT ANN. § 39.01 (West 2015).
52. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (West 2015).
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Accordingly, parents, spouses/partners, biological children, stepchildren,
foster-children, stepparents and foster-parents are considered members of
the immediate family. The CFR further excludes other relatives even when
living in the same household. 53 Due to the many normative ramifications
that arise, the definition that I advance does not fall in line with some aspects of the CFR definition. For instance, I argue that the mere fact that an
individual does not fall into the category of 'immediate family' cannot be
used as a justification to deny them of any rights that may arise because of
the pretrial detention of a family member. The view that I have adopted can
also be substantiated with reference to the DRL. The definition of 'family'
is required to take into account the economic dependency of such units and
its political and economic functions as have also been identified by important IHRL conventions such as the ICCPR and the International Covenant
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Therefore, any definition of 'family' cannot adopt a dismissive stance towards other family
members who do not fall within the restrictive scope of 'immediate family.'
The other challenge that one faces in forming a definition is the use of
the terms 'family,' 'traditional family,' 'immediate family' 54 and 'functional equivalent of a traditional family' in different contexts. Nonetheless,
it is safe to determine that each of these terms do not require separate analysis as they are interchangeable and because an ordinary person is capable of
understanding the terms to include certain individuals such as parents,
spouse, children and other family members dependent on one another and
living under one roof. Such a determination is also substantiated by Morrissey v. Apostol, where the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York held in relation to zoning laws that that terms 'family' and 'functional
equivalent of a traditional family' are not unconstitutionally vague. The
Court highlighted the degree of certainty required in that regard is one sufficient to afford a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence to not be forced
55
to guess at the meaning.
Even though the examples above indicate an almost metaphysical attempt to characterize what a 'family' should include and what it ideally
should be, the task is made somewhat easier by IHRL. The HRC adopts a
rather broad view of what a family should consist of in relation to Article
17 of the ICCPR by allowing states to define families in accordance with
the respective cultural practices. It requests state parties to give the term a
"a broad interpretation to include all those comprising the family as under53. 29 C.F.R. § 780.308
54. But see Colo. Const.
ber'; held unconstitutional by
55. 75 A.D.3d 993, 996

(2016) (defining immediate family).
art. XXVIII § 2(8.5) (defining 'immediate family memDallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 2010).
(N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
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stood in the society of the state party concerned' and invites states to indicate in their reports the meaning given in their society to the terms family
and home." 56 The notion that the definition for family members may vary
according to the state is further highlighted by the HRC in GC 19 as was
indicated above. 57 Hence, the term 'family' should be taken to mean the
members who live in one unit and are emotionally, socially, economically
and legally attached to one another in a manner that enables them to claim
rights when one member is held in unlawful pretrial detention because they
too become victims of such circumstances.
III.
A.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE TO HUMAN RIGHTS: BRIDGING THE GAP

FactualBackground

The World Prison Population List (WPPL) records a total of 2,239,751
detainees in U.S. prisons as of October 2013.58 This number is inclusive of
pretrial detainees and is the highest recorded detention rate in the world. 59 It
ranks above China, which has a total detention record of 1,640,000.60 According to the empirical data collected by International Center for Prison
Studies (ICPS), there were 480,000 pretrial/remand detainees in the U.S. as
of May 2014.61 In relation to the high number of pretrial detainees in the
world, the Director of ICPS states that "many of [them] are held unnecessarily, for exceptionally long periods and in conditions which fall far short of
internationally agreed standards." 62 Moreover, many works containing the
research efforts of Open Society Foundation refer to the U.S. as the country
with the highest number of pretrial detainees. It further notes that disregard56. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 17, Gen. Comment
16
5 (Apr. 8, 1988), http://ccprcentre.org/doc/ICCPR/General%2OComments/
HRI.GEN.I.Rev.9%28Vol.I%29_%28GC16%29_en.pdf (internal quotations omitted).
57. ICCPR, Gen. Comment 19, supra note 44, 2.
58. Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List (10th ed.), APCCA, http://

www.apcca.org/uploads/1 0thEdition_2013.pdf.
59. Id.

60. The number of detainees in China does not include pretrial detainees. But see
International Center for Prison Studies, Close to Three Million People in PretrialDetention Worldwide, New Report Shows, INST. FOR CRIM. POL'Y RES., http://
www.prisonstudies.org/news/close-three-mi Iion-people-pre-trial-detention-worldwidenew-report-shows (reporting a total of 250,000 pretrial detainees in China as of May
2014).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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ing pretrial detainees can lead to serious human rights violations that are not
63
restricted to the individual in the physical control of the authorities.
The golden thread woven into criminal justice is that an individual
charged with a crime, a pretrial detainee and a suspect are innocent until
proven guilty. This originates from the Latin expression ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat, which roughly translates to mean that the burden of proving an individual guilty lies on the one who claims that such
individual is guilty. However, it is doubtful whether the presumption of
innocence is applied effectively in the contemporary legal system of the
U.S. Both the prison statistics mentioned above and Shima Baradaran's
analysis of how the shifts in law have swung towards favoring pretrial detention based on judicial findings prior to a determination of facts by a
jury, 64 are useful in proving the presumption of innocence is not given primacy by current law. A further conclusion that can be drawn is that nearly
500,000 families are negatively affected in some form due to pretrial
detention.
While I will not analyze the specific flaws of the U.S. legal system that
lead to pretrial detention it is necessary to turn to IHRL in order to ascertain
the rights, if any, which can be made available to the family members of the
detainee. First, one must ascertain whether there are justifications to draw
from IHRL without restricting the analysis to domestic human rights jurisprudence. The resolution of the above question then leads to the second
predicament as to whether it is necessary to determine what rights carry the
highest import and how such rights should be incorporated into the domestic jurisprudence to seek enforcement. Thirdly, it is necessary to come full
circle and link such rights to the unlawful pretrial detention that occurred
through the legal system, which necessitated the quest for enforceable rights
in a different domain. Therefore, I shall turn to these three aspects in this
part.
B.

Should Family Members Have Rights and Remedies Emanatingfrom
Unlawful Detention?

This Article seeks to promote the notion that the state should provide
rights and remedies to the family members of the detainee who are affected
by the unlawful detention, and that such rights and remedies should be
treated separately from the state's liability towards the detained individual.
In order to construct a norm-making process, it is essential that the jurispru-

63. See generally OPEN Soc'Y FOUNDS., supra note 2.
64. See Baradaran, supra note 9, at 401.
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dential and philosophical underpinnings pertaining to human rights are
taken into account.
It is noteworthy that in the international human rights sphere, "positivist underpinnings are shaky" 65 and raise the bar much higher when one attempts to interlace two different domains of law. This calls into question the
nature of rights that ought to be made available to the family members of
the detainee. In this segment, I refer to Jerome Shestack and Morton
Horowitz, who respectively argued or acknowledged the perception of
human rights as subjective 66 and that rights may have a dual application
67
whereby one party benefits while the other suffers.
Shestack states:
[H]ow we understand the meaning of human rights will influence our
judgments on such issues as which rights are regarded as absolute,
which are universal, which should be given priority, which can be
overruled by other interests, which call for international pressures,
which can demand programs for implementation, and which will be
fought for. 68
It is important that rights too can have a hierarchical structure of importance. In this context, undoubtedly the rights of the detainee should be
given primacy over and above the rights of the family members as the latter
have not lost their right to liberty. However, that does not mean that there is
no opportunity at all to provide rights to family members at any cost. The
rights that I argue for in this Article-the right to privacy and family life,
the fight to conjugal visits, the right to spend recreational time with family
members and the right to compensation are rights that can be equally beneficial to the detainee as well as the family members. The high proportion of
pretrial detention in the U.S. also indicates that it is time to demand programs for implementation of these rights and that international pressure (in
this context through decisions of international bodies for instance) can be
utilized in promoting rights.
All human rights are dependent on a nexus between an individual and
a state. This could be based on an individual's relationship with another
individual who is an agent of the state, which gives rise to a claim against
the state. Human rights communications could also be brought by an individual seeking to move an international body or tribunal to pressure his or
65. Jerome J. Shestack, The Jurisprudenceof Human Rights, in I HUMAN RIGHTS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES

202 (Theodor Meron ed., 1986).

66. Id.
67. Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CRITICAL
PHILOSOPHY (Brian H. Bix ed., 2006).
68. Shestack, supra note 65.

CONCEPTS IN

2015-2016]

Justice in Dire Straits

her state to grant him or her rights based on the nexus that exists between
him or her and another individual who has been victimized by the state.
Such individuals seek to claim that the nexus between the direct victim and
the claimant, entitles the latter to a set of rights in connection with, and
independent of, the rights of the direct victim.
It is clear that claims by family members of the detainee in pretrial
contexts arise due to such a complex chain of connections. In this exercise,
one must positively prove that the pretrial detention is unlawful. Secondly,
one must prove that there is a valid and legitimate relationship between the
individual who is in pretrial detention and the individual claiming the right.
Thirdly, the alleged harm suffered by the family member must be shown to
be consequent upon either the state's delay in holding the trial or the detention which has become tainted by unlawfulness. Fourthly, it must be proven
that prior to the unlawful detention, the status quo of the family was better
than at present. Finally, proof that releasing the detainee or conducting the
trial in a timely manner, or remedies given by the state are capable of genuinely remedying the situation, must be shown. A broken link in this chain
would severely harm the causal nexus that is required for a family member
of the detainee to justify their claims. Hence, this five-fold approach should
be adopted to establish the rather difficult interlink between the domestic
legal system and IHRL. In addition, the general rule according to which a
claim is considered admissible is based on proof that domestic remedies
have been exhausted or there is no effective remedy available for the claims
in the domestic system.
I now turn to human rights law as a tool to promulgate the notion that
the bridging of the gap between the two domains enables a meaningful coexistence. This, in turn, will lead to lesser violations of rights of family
members of a detainee and it would contribute to the reduction of unlawful
pretrial detention. In this exercise, Horwitz's conception of rights holds significance as it propounds how "rights have helped and hurt the struggle for
a more just society. ' 69 It can be used to expose how the rights of the majority to be safe from suspected offenders, and the state's interest in successfully convicting arrested suspects, have overridden the rights of the family
members of the detainee to the extent that the legal system fails to take
account of such rights at all. The dual purpose of law of helping and hurting
the struggle for human rights is also evident in provisions such as § 3142
(g) (3) (A) of the U.S.C. that was analyzed above. 70 Horwitz further sub69. Horwitz, supra note 67, at 28.
70. Such laws can be interpreted broadly or narrowly. Depending on the interpretation, the lack of community ties for instance, could mean that the detainee has a
higher flight risk which will be used in justifying the pretrial detention. But it is ques-
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stantiates the argument that rights are still capable of preserving the 'rich
and the powerful,' 71 which can be substantiated with Sadhbh Walshe's argument that the likelihood of being jailed for months prior to trial is much
higher for the poor and the potential to being released on bail is directly
proportional to the potential of being acquitted. 72 These difficulties indicate
there are other concerns underlying the laws pertaining to pretrial detention.
This calls for an analysis of the politics of human rights.
C. Politics of Human Rights
Alison Kesby argues the question is not of "being recognized as a
rights-bearer by virtue of a conferred legal or political status, but of demonstrating that one is a subject of rights." 73 This indicates a category of individuals can be regarded by law as bearing rights and yet not be considered
'subjects' of those rights. In other words, Kesby shows how interpretations
can lead to the denial of rights to those who are right-bearers. It is thus
axiomatic that human rights contain political connotations. Hence, in any
attempt to combine two overlapping frameworks with the notion of unifying them, the analysis would fall short of the preconceived aspirations in
failing to address politics of human rights. Kesby correctly points out that
the "analysis centres less on law and more on the claims of political philosophy as to how the right to have rights is to be interpreted." 74
Kesby's treatment of human rights is connected to the notion of citizenship. It is possible to interpret that approach as an attempt to find a
nexus to connect the right bearer with the 'right,' which is taken as an abstract concept. The application of the same approach to this context would
demand a nexus be recognized as between the family members of the detainee and the rights that I argue for in this Article. However, the nexus
required here poses different 'political' concerns than what she argues for,
as a state's perception of what constitutes a family plays a major role in
determining whether the individuals concerned are in fact eligible to claim a
tionable whether the mere lack of community ties indicates a danger to society from the
pretrial detainee. Hence, these laws can grant the relevant authority a large margin of
discretion thereby leading to discrimination.
71. Id. at 29.
72. Sadhbh Walshe, America's bail system: one law for the rich, anotherfor the

poor, THE GUARDIAN, (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2013/feb/14/america-bail-system-law-rich-poor.
73. ALISON KESBY, THE RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS: CITIZENSHIP, HUMANITY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 118 (2012).
74. Id.
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right. 75 Moreover, if citizenship ought to be regarded as the ground warranting the granting of human rights, it will negate the universal nature of rights
that are connected to liberty that IHRL aspires to achieve. That approach
could also complicate my attempt in this Article to argue that family members, even if residing outside the territory of the U.S. may be eligible to
receive certain rights in the event that a member of their family is found to
be detained unlawfully within the U.S. In this respect, I depart from
Kesby's position. I do not concur with her position that one must be a national of the state to be entitled to rights. For instance, the preamble of the
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) recognizes that rights are
not based on nationality but on 'human personality.'
Legal legitimacy of the claims that can be raised by the family members of the detainee is, to an extent, dependent on the political legitimacy of
the claims. The discourse becomes politicized in pretrial detention-related
rights, as inability to pay bail, for instance, gives rise to longer periods of
pretrial detention only for a particular class of people. 76 This violates the
very norm that the law undertakes to preserve: equal treatment under the
law. Such violations taking place in the U.S. can be addressed through the
implementation of the provisions of the ICCPR which is analyzed more
fully in the segments that follow.
Pablo Gilabert 77 asserts that the political and practical perspective of
human rights ought to be contrasted with the traditional understanding of
human rights, whereby the rights are viewed as existing prior to an institutional structure. 78 Often, when institutional importance is not acknowledged, the possibility of creating a framework of rights suffers, as it would
amount to the creation of a norm or policy that does not contain the metaphorical teeth to bite. If human rights are perceived as functioning within an
institutional structure, its political connotations naturally become known.
The first step in any attempt to establish family members of a detainee have
tangible rights that can be claimed under IHRL ought to recognize the political underpinnings that create barriers for new rights to come into existence.
The suppression of new rights, from the stance of governance, is sensible as
it facilitates smooth governance, although the claim that governance can be
smooth when rights are suppressed is rather ironic. The reality is that it in
fact constitutes a suppression of rights which ought to be acknowledged.
75. See supra Section II.B.
FOUNDS., supra note 6.
77. Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Concordia
University.

76. See generally OPEN Soc'"

78. Pablo Gilabert, Humanist and PoliticalPerspectives of Human Rights, 39 POL.
THEORY

439 (2011).
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Such acknowledgement is the first step in addressing the concerns. Gilabert
claims the understanding of 'political' and 'practical' perspectives of
human rights as complementary to the traditional understanding of human
rights, i.e. 'humanist' or 'naturalistic,' proves that both aspects are neces79
sary for full realization of human rights.
In the context of pretrial detention, any attempt to create a framework
for family members to claim rights, involves primarily the institutional aspects of the prison system and the state. The aspirations of the prison system to incarcerate anyone who breaches the law or is suspected to have
breached a law, complements the normative deterrent, retributive and incapacitation objectives of the state. While the institutional aspirations may be
reflective of the majoritarian outlook of the general society, the objective of
the law ought to be the provision of justice and equal access to justice.
The use of the term 'minority' generally triggers symbols of racial or
ethnic minorities. However, I use the term minority to represent those
whose interests are not adequately represented lex lata in any given context.
Because of having definitive symbolic meanings as to what minorities signify, the general application of the word becomes rather restricted, preventing the masses from viewing those who are adversely affected by pretrial
detentions as minorities. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to
engage in an etymological and semantic analysis of the term 'minority,' it
suffices to state the particular class of society affected by pretrial detentions
should be perceived as a minority. This could be a class of people who are
either poor, less powerful or belong to ethnic minorities, and which is incapable of paying bail or obtaining services from top-tier influential counsels
who are capable of pulling the legal strings for an expedited trial. This practical aspect contributes to the perpetuation of problems faced by pretrial
detainees and their family members.
Gilabert gives much prominence to "coherence with practice and justification" in the five-dimensional analytical framework proposed in his synthesized political-naturalistic approach to human rights. 80 He emphasizes
that "the view of human rights as institutionally bounded is particularly
coherent with current legal and political practice."' 8' Although, Gilabert fails

to respond to the question of the nature of the institutions he deals with in
his analysis, this question was raised and answered in late 2004 by Professor Roland of the University of California. 82 He classifies institutions into
79.
80.
81.
82.
onomics

Id. at 440.
See generally id.
Id.at 440.
E. Morris Cox Professor of Economics and Professor of Political Science, EcDepartment, University of California, Berkeley.
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slow-moving and fast-moving ones, showing different approaches that
ought to be adopted when seeking to alter existing political stances. 83 While
Roland's approach to classified institutions takes an economic turn, a similar line of thought can be utilized to alter the existing mindset pertaining to
institutional control of pretrial detention.
1. Slow-Moving Institutions
Roland identifies culture, values, beliefs and social norms as examples
of slow-moving institutions. 84 The perceptions embedded in society are difficult to change and it is apt to call such institutions slow-moving. While
human rights activism may be capable of gradually altering slow-moving
institutions, the legal framework is also capable of changing institutions
such as the ones mentioned above. There is an important reciprocal interconnection between slow-moving and fast-moving institutions in that the
former shapes the latter, and as time goes by the transfigured version of the
latter helps alter the former. It has to be understood that the rights that are
propounded in this article have to be introduced gradually through policy
changes and that such policy changes are inherently associated with longer
85
durations of lobbying.
2.

Fast-Moving Institutions

Functional approach and macrosystemic approach are two different
tools that Roland identifies for classifying different institutions. Under the
functional approach "a specific institution corresponds to each [economic]
need, while the macrosystemic approach 'starts from a descriptive list of
different institutions going from general to specific categories." 86 The latter
method concentrates on political, legal and social institutions, which ac87
cording to him are more capable of creating a sustainable development.
The sense in which I apply this theory to the pretrial detention context is
based on the ideology of altering legal institutions. Hence, the fast-moving
institution in this sense ought to be a change brought through the legal
framework of the country.
As pointed out above, there is an inherent interdependence between
fast-moving and slow-moving institutions. While cultural and societal
83. G6rard Roland, UnderstandingInstitutional Change: Fast-Moving and SlowMoving Institutions, 38 STUD. IN COMP. INT'L DEV. 109 (2004).

84. Id. at 109.
85. See generally RissE ET AL., supra note 16.
86. Roland, supra note 83, at 112.
87. Id.
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changes are important, such changes are often impossible to achieve when
divorced from institutional alterations. Especially, when concerning rights,
the changes have to adopt mandatory initial steps within a legal framework.
Although activism pertaining to human rights may trigger this, at the initial
stages there exists many societal barriers that prevent such rights from succeeding. Classic examples for the above assertion appear with regard to
granting equality to women or racial minorities. Moreover, the spiral model
of human rights also leads one to the same result.
In short, much depends on how regimes can be encouraged to appreciate the link between the criminal justice system and IHRL so they are not
treated as completely severable from one another, but instead perceived as
sufficiently connected for the implementation of one system to give rise to
rights under the other. The realization that a change for family members can
only be effectively brought through fast-moving institutions lays the foundation for analyzing the existing legal framework. Such an approach helps
ascertain lex lata and strengthens justifications for formulating lexferenda.
The existence of moral connections between wrongdoing and the application of criminal law for retributive or deterrent purposes is undisputed.
Nonetheless, in light of the State being responsible for all citizens within its
care, the moral philosophy that I appeal to in this context is different in
nature in that I seek to promote morality in general with specific reference
to secular morality. Such secular morality can only be gained by altering the
existing legal framework, which is identified in this segment as a fast-moving institution. Effectively altering fast-moving institutions will ultimately
contribute to the change of perceptions in culture and value-based institutions thus creating a consensus that disfavors unlawful pretrial detention
which will be perceived for what it really is, namely, the violation of rights
of the detainee as well as those of the family members of the detainee.
D.

Legal Framework

In questioning the reasons for initial opposition to a federal government, Dean Russell states:
The power of government is always a dangerous weapon in any
hands. The founders of our government were students of history as
well as statesmen. They knew that without exception every government in recorded history had at one time or another turned its power
- its coercive power as the police force - against its own citizens -
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confiscated their property, imprisoned
them, enslaved them, and
88
made a mockery of personal dignity.
The quoted passage succinctly sums up the trust society places in institutions can be misused by such authorities if the discretion is not controlled
through law. The impact it has on personal dignity was, is and will always
be a major concern. The power that rests on the legislature to draft laws to
enable pretrial detention, to the extent that it grants discretionary power to a
sitting judge to determine the period of pretrial detention, does in fact make
a mockery of personal dignity which makes one question the efficacy of the
Bill of Rights that was included in the Constitution to prevent that very
mockery. The judges too are helpless in this regard to a certain extent due to
various pressures (external or otherwise) unless they adopt a radical activist
stance in altering the indifferent 'hands-off approach' to detention practices.
Russell refers to the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution as a "bill of
prohibitions against government" as it restricts the power of government to
make laws that would infringe the rights of individuals. 89 Individual liberty,
equality, and restriction of discretionary power-which can adversely affect
either liberty or equality-are at the core of the Constitution. In this regard,
Amendments V, VI and VIII are directly relevant to the criminal justice
system. These Amendments also lay the foundation to draw from the international bill of human rights. Amendment V prohibits the deprivation of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, while Amendment VI
guarantees a right to a fair trial, and Amendment VIII prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment along with the prohibition on excessive bail and excessive fines. I proceed with the presumption that each of these Amendments,
in turn, creates rights for the family members of the detainee. 90
1. Domestic to Cosmic: Domestic Human Rights Framework to
IHRL
In this segment, I evaluate the possibility of resorting to IHRL to guarantee the rights of the family members of the detainee. In general, this is
premised on the notion that there are many underpinning theoretical justifications pertaining to IHRL to warrant drawing from it to enrich the body of
law applicable in the domestic sphere. Risse and Sikkink argue ideas and
norms pertaining to IHRL have an influence on domestic behavior of states
although, unfortunately, only a few scholars have "demonstrated the actual
88. Dean Russell, The Bill of Rights, in THE
26-27 (1952).
89. Id. at 29.
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90. Constitutional law is not analyzed as it is beyond the scope of this Article.
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impact that international norms can have on domestic politics." 9' These authors use the spiral model to show how international instruments of rights
can impact the behavior of governments of states party to such instruments.
For a comprehensive view of the model they developed, I refer to their two
seminal works-The Power of Human Rights: InternationalNorms and
Domestic Change, and The PersistentPower of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance. They initially developed the spiral model to "incorporate simultaneous activities at four levels into one framework" 92and
named it a five-phase model 93 of norm-socialization. 94 The five phases of
the model indicate five stages a government goes through prior to becoming
an international norm-complying state. The five phases are: repression, de95
nial, tactical concessions, prescriptive status and rule-consistent behavior.
In this theory, the authors give primacy to "the domestic society in the
norm-violating state, the links between the societal opposition and the transnational networks." 96 They focus on how domestic pressure rising from
within a state can lead to the alteration of state behavior. This is compatible
with the arguments in Section 3.3.1 where I portrayed how a society can
influence the change of laws. Moreover, in Section 5.4.2, in the analysis of
extraterritorial application of human rights, the influence of the spiral model
is visible in that there is rising domestic pressure against the narrow interpretation of the provisions of the ICCPR, which prevent individuals from
benefitting from the full extent of the rights therein.
In addition to Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, Anne-Marie Slaughter and
William Burke-White are two scholars who adopted the stance that resorting to IHRL can improve domestic law. They commence their analysis in
The Future of InternationalLaw is Domestic stating:
International law has traditionally been just that - international. Consisting of a largely separate set of legal rules and institutions, international law has long governed relationships among States. Under the
traditional rules of international law, the claims of individuals could
only reach the international plane when a State exercised diplomatic
protection and espoused the claims of its nationals in an international
forum. More recently international law has penetrated the once exclusive zone of domestic affairs to regulate the relationships between
91. RissE

ET AL.,

92. Id. at 21.
93. RISSE ET
94. RISSE
95. RiSSE

96.

supra note 16, at 1,2.

AL.,

supra note 15, at 103.

ET AL.,

supra note 16, at 6.
supra note 15, at 103.

ET AL.,

RISSE ET AL.,

supra note 16, at 18.
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governments and their own citizens, particularly through the97growing
bodies of human rights law and international criminal law.
They then move on to a comprehensive analysis as to how a shift has
come into place in IHRL and international law in general. The authors refer
to how "the EU law has migrated from a thin set of agreements based on the
functional needs of states in to a far more programmatic comprehensive
legal order." 98 The examples and the analysis that Slaughter and BurkeWhite have employed indicate their preference in resorting to IHRL to enrich and develop domestic law. These two scholars are not alone in this
endeavor and the approach is praise-worthy as it helps domestic jurisprudence absorb developments from a global perspective, thereby enabling it to
provide better rights to those within its territory and jurisdiction.
Even though it is appealing to resort to scholarly works which adopt a
similar line of reasoning as I have in this article, the real challenge lies in
identifying the domestic laws that justify having recourse to IHRL. The
primary basis on which IHRL can be resorted to within the U.S., can be
found in Article VI (2) of the Constitution. It makes all treaties made under
the authority of the Constitution the Supreme Law of the Land. Although
there are doubts regarding the extent of application, 99 an approach of modern internationalism enables one to draw from international treaties. One
can arrive at such a presumption validly when opiniojurispertaining to the
matter is read in conjunction with the jurisprudence of the HRC and current
state practice with regard to the ICCPR.1°°
According to Immanuel Kant, the rights that states have undertaken in
the international sphere underjuspublicum civitatum'0 formally require the
97. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International
Law is Domestic (or,The European Way of Law) in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE
BETWEEN

NATIONAL

AND

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

110

(Janne Nijman & Andrd

Nollkaemper eds., 2007).
98. Id. at 112.
99. Many sources are available to assist in this analysis. Cf.Medellin v. Texas 128
S.Ct. 1346 (2008); Safety Nat. Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London,
587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009); Fund for Animal Inc. v. Kempthorne, 472 F.3d 872 (D.C.
Cir. 2006); Renkel v. United States, 456 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2006). (2009); David Sloss,
The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations
And Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129 (1999).
100. Opinio Juris on the matter is analyzed in Section V.D.2. See Hum. Rts.

Comm., Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of the United States of
America, I 4(a), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 24, 2013).
101. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE As THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 213 (W. Hastie
trans., T.&T. Clark 1887) (1796).
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state to apply those rights meaningfully within the domestic jurisdiction. He
mainly emphasizes the existence of a connection between international law
and domestic justice, which has found approval in the writings of subsequent authors. 10 2 The above proposition advanced by Kant is used in this
article in establishing the argument that family members of the detainee
have rights emanating from pretrial detention that can be invoked against
the state by resorting to the international obligations the state has undertaken specifically through the IHRL.
2. International Instruments
The UDHR recognizes in Article 12 that no one should be subject to
arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence and
that everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. The UDHR further highlights the importance of the family
unit and reiterates that it should be protected even from the state. 03 The
ACHR adopted in 1969, recognizes in its preamble that "rights of man are
not derived from one's being a national of a certain state, but are based
upon the attributes of the human personality, and that they therefore justify
international protection in the form of a Convention reinforcing or complementing the protection provided by the domestic law of the American
states." However, the U.S- remains merely a signatory to the treaty since
1977 without ratification of the same, which makes it difficult to effectively
rely on the provisions of the ACHR.
In 1998, the U.S. ratified the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
Mental suffering intentionally inflicted for purposes of obtaining a confession from an individual or a third person amounts to torture under Article I
of the CAT. While this is applicable to the family members of the detainee,
it is impossible to determine whether the unintended consequences of the
pretrial detention could satisfy the requirements of Article I of CAT. Furthermore, the "Understanding" added by the U.S., which states that "the
definition of torture in Article I is intended to apply 'only to acts directed
against persons in the offender's custody or physical control,"°4 hinders
any possibility of this Article being applied to the family members of the
detainee. The hindrance is two-fold, as the state is capable of arguing that
102. Fernando R. Thson, The KantianTheory of InternationalLaw, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 53 (1992).

103. UDHR, supra note I art. 16(3) ("The family is the natural and fundamental
group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.").

104. See Comm. against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5 (Oct. 15,
1999).
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the impact on family members is unintended and they are not in the offender's custody or physical control.
General Comment 03 of the Committee Against Torture defines victims to include 'immediate family members. ' 01 5 Although not binding, the
General Comment's validity and meaningfulness in this respect cannot be
denied because:
[General Comments] are means by which a UN human rights expert
committee distils its considered views on an issue which arises out of
the provisions of the treaty whose implementation it supervises and
of its underpresents those views in the context of a formal statement
06
importance.
major
attaches
it
which
standing to
Accordingly, even if the 'understanding' that has been recorded by the
U.S. could deny remedies for mental torture on the aforementioned technical grounds, the objective and purpose of the CAT remains unchanged. Furthermore, it is widely accepted that State parties should abstain from acts,
which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. 10 7 Even in cases of
'Reservations', their validity is conditional upon their compliance with the
object and purpose of the treaty. 10 8 Hence, the mere fact that an 'Understanding' applies to the provisions of the CAT cannot be justifiably used by
the State to avoid compliance with a particular provision. Alternatively,
family members' right to invoke mental torture under CAT remains a possibility in light of unlawful detentions. However, it is impossible to argue that
this right will be handed down to such family members on a silver platter
anytime in the near future. Therefore, it is necessary to turn to other rights
that can lay the stepping-stones to this destination.
The U.S. has not ratified the ICESCR, Convention on the Elimination
of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The U.S. remains a mere signatory to
these. 109 The supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution indicates the treaties entered into have the capacity of becoming the supreme law of the
105. Comm. against Torture, General Comment No. 3 of the Committee against
Torture, 3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/3 (Nov. 19, 2012).
106. Philip Alston, The Historical Origins of "General Comments" in Human
Rights Law, in THE

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM IN QUEST OF EQUITY AND UNIVER-

(2011).
107. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
108. Id. art. 19(c).
109. The three Covenants were respectively signed on October 5, 1977, July 17,
1980, and February 16, 1995.
SALITY
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land.110 Irrespective of the supremacy clause, the general stance of the U.S.
is that supremacy in the domestic sphere is only applicable to ratified treaties and it essentially nullifies the favorable impact that could have been
created through Article VI.
3.

ICCPR

The United States is also a party to the ICCPR which in Article 9 (1)
guarantees the "right to liberty and security of person" and protection from
"arbitrary arrest or detention." Timely notification of the arrested party of
the reasons and charges against him is also a requirement of Article 9 (2). In
general, this Article emphasizes the importance of conducting a hearing
promptly."' Article 9 (1) through (4) are specifically applicable to the detained person. Article 9 (5) may arguably be extended to the family
12
members.1
Article 14 establishes the right to equality before a court of law accompanied by the right to a fair trial.' 13 This guarantees the presumption of
innocence, the right to a prompt trial, equality, adequate time and facilities
for forming a proper defense, the right to be tried without undue delay, the
right to examine and have witnesses examined, the right to have the services of an interpreter and not be compelled to testify against him. Article
17 (1) guarantees protection from arbitrary and unlawful interference with
the family. Article 17 (2) which establishes in absolute form that "everyone
has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks," can be used by the family members of a detainee as a fundamental
premise on which the protection is sought from IHRL in the context of
unlawful pretrial detention. Article 23 (1) recognizes the family "as the natural and fundamental group unit of society' which is 'entitled to protection
by society and state" and Article 24 (1) lays the framework for 'every child'
to have a right to measures of protection "by his status as a minor, on the
110. U.S. CONST. art. VI ("this Constitution and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, under the authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and all Judges in every States
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the

Contrary notwithstanding").
I11. ICCPR, supra note I art. 9(3) ("anyone arrested or detained on a criminal
charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to
release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in
custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage
of the judicial proceedings, and should occasion arise, for execution of the judgment").
112. See discussion infra Section V.B.2.c.
113. See infra Section IV.B.3.
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part of his family, society and the state." In the pretrial detention context,
Articles 23 and 24 hold significance as they transform into international
norms that can contribute to norm-setting in the domestic sphere. The right
to family life, privacy, conjugal rights and recreational time argued for in
the latter segment of the article are inextricably linked to these basic rights
drawn from the ICCPR.
Some rights mentioned herein are used in the section that follows to
substantiate the foundational rights of family members argued for in this
article. Where such matters are arguably vague, reference will be made to
GCs of the HRC and the travaux priparatoiresof the ICCPR for authority
and substantiation. The array of rights pertaining to detention and family
members in the ICCPR is a justification for relying on the IHRL framework
in one's attempts to solidify rights of the family members. Hence, in order
to ascertain whether the IHRL framework lays the normative foundation for
rights to be extended to family members in situations of unlawful pretrial
detention, analogical references will be made in the segment that follows to
the decisions of IACHR and the ECtHR in similar matters.
IV.
A.

PRETRIAL DETENTIONS AND DETAINEES' FAMILIES

Overview

The foregoing segments of this article laid down the framework for the
argument that in certain contexts pretrial detention becomes unlawful
thereby affecting the family members of such detainees. I argue in this segment that when such an unlawful detention occurs, family members, as defined above, become victims of the circumstances. I contend that, albeit
unintentional, the state bears responsibility to remedy the issues and respond to their grievances in the qualified circumstances in which the IHRL
framework considers them indirect victims.
The family members of detainees invariably suffer socio-economic effects irrespective of whether the detention is pretrial, post-trial, lawful, or
unlawful.' 1 4 Even though these effects may be largely similar in all of the
categories mentioned above, the unlawfulness associated with a detention,
especially when it occurs in the pretrial context, creates a stronger foundation for the analysis of rights that can be extended to family members. That
is on the premise that state intervention, being inherently unlawful, results
in the violation of rights not only of the individual directly involved but also
of those who are connected to the individual. Prior to ascertaining what
rights should be so extended, it is essential to identify the nature of the
114. See generally OPEN Soc'y

FOUNDS.,

supra note 6.
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impact on the family members, the situations in which they can be considered as victims, and the obligations that the state has to fulfill. Hence, in
this part of the article, the aforementioned aspects will be analyzed as a
precursor to the analysis of rights for which family members should have a
legal claim in pretrial detention contexts.
B.

ComplicationsArising Out of Marginality

It is important in respect to laws of the U.S., that have been referred to
in previous segments, to take into account the social, cultural, economic,
and political factors that affect family members of a detainee. Such differences exist due to the standards of life being different among different social hierarchies. If the standards of life remain precariously imbalanced
between such social groups, the system of justice will be negatively affected. "Most people in pretrial detention are poor... by the standards of the
society in which they live. The poor are more likely to come into conflict
with the law, more likely to be detained pending trial, and less able to afford the three B's of pretrial release; bribe, bail or barrister." 115 This is a
problem of marginality that should be taken into consideration when assessing the impact created on the family, when drafting new laws, or when
evaluating policy considerations to bring domestic law up to speed with
IHRL norms."16 It is important to recognize such groups as socio-economic

minorities not in the sense they are a minority as a percentage of the population, but in the sense they are not able to access the protection of the law
with ease. In connection thereto, the family members of the detainee are
equally disadvantaged as the law still poses barriers to recognize the need to
enable them to have a remedy as they are merely considered indirect victims of unintended consequences of certain inherent features of pretrial detention. Unless this marginality is taken for what it is (i.e. a disadvantage
which the law fails to take into account), remedying the situation becomes
utopian.
1. Societal Influence and Repercussions on Families
Previous studies authoritatively prove those who are subject to pretrial
detention are the poor, marginalized, fractions of minority communities,
non-citizens, mentally ill, intellectually disabled and individuals belonging

115.

OPEN

Soc'y

note 2, at 30.
supra note 6 (giving a detailed analysis of pretrial

FOUNDS., supra

116. See OPEN Soc'y

FOUNDS.,

detention's socio-economic impact on the family members).
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to other vulnerable groups." 7 Empirical data is unnecessary to state there is
historical oppression in relation to the aforementioned categories irrespective of attempts at social equality or justice.
Most human rights changes have arisen not merely because of powerful institutions or lawmakers' attempts to provide equality but through societal groups of revolution, activism and many years of struggle. The spiral
model of human rights and the analysis on slow-moving institutions bear
evidence to this reality. Success stories are as much a part of the human
rights rhetoric applicable in this context as it is applicable to contexts of
racial or gender segregation. The very success of such attempts can be used
in order to create a momentum amongst the public regarding the injustices
of pretrial detention, which result in undue burdens on the family members
of the detainee.
It is undisputed that there are many factors affecting individual behavior. Environmental factors belong to one such category that can impact individual behavior. What I take environmental factors to mean in this context
is the family environment. Its impact on family members has been studied
previously from a sociological perspective absent of any legal analysis. For
instance, when a parent is in pretrial detention, children invariably suffer as
has been shown in The Socioeconomic Impact of PretrialDetention." 8 The
suffering would not only be caused by the absence of the parent but also by
the discriminatory treatment prevalent in general in society. There are circumstances in which children are stripped off their innocence due to continuous harassment. It is quite possible for some of these children to develop
anti-social behavioral patterns. In families where the absent parent functions as the sole breadwinner, the situation becomes even worse as the parent or guardian who is taking care of the child may have to be away from
home for long durations in order to find money for the sustenance of the
family. While these sociological perspectives are self-evident, what remains
to be studied is how such influences can be responded to by the use of the
law. Unlawful pretrial detention not only affects the mentality of children
but also affects the psychological health of the family members who are,
more often than not, left destitute due to long durations of pretrial detention.
Society's reluctance to interact with such families may cause anti-social
behavior amongst the adult family members as well. While a detailed analysis of the socio-economic impacts on family members are not provided in
this article, it may be presumed that the example provided above and the
literature referred to lay the foundation to demonstrate authoritatively that
117. See also Samuel R. Wiseman, PretrialDetention and the Right to be Monitored, 123 YALE L. J. 1344 (2014).
118. OPEN Soc'y FOUNDS., supra note 6.
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such an impact justifies the invocation of the law to remedy the imbalances.
Therefore, it is important to recognize that pretrial detention results in costs
that are burdensome for society. It is much easier to prevent these social
costs rather than address them once they arise. Use of law to regulate pretrial detention better would be one mechanism through which such a goal
may be realized. Once the law is developed to the desired level, enforcement mechanisms can be strengthened by holding individuals and institutions responsible for unlawful pretrial detentions, and undue delays in due
process in general. They can further be held monetarily liable for the effects
family members of the detainee have suffered."l 9
2.

'Fair Balance' Test

In all the circumstances mentioned above, the result is unlawful intervention of the state in the privacy and family life of the detainee. Cecilia
Medina, President of the IACHR, has argued similarly in relation to the
ACHR I20 while the ECtHR, 12 1 HRC and other human rights organizations
also adopt a similar approach. 12 2In Ferla v. Poland 23 where the wife of a
pretrial detainee applied for permission to visit him, permission was not
granted on the grounds that the wife was called as a witness by the prosecution. Even on the occasions she was allowed to visit him, they had been
prevented from engaging in effective communication. The court concluded:
[The authorities] went beyond what was necessary in a democratic
society "to prevent disorder and crime." Indeed the measure in question reduced the applicant's family life to a degree that can be justified neither by the inherent limitations involved in detention nor by
the pursuance of the legitimate aim relied on by the Government. The
Court therefore holds that the authorities failed to maintain a fair bal119. A comprehensive analysis of remedies that should be made available to family members of the detainee and the state and/or individual responsibility follows in
Section V.

120. CECILIA MEDINA,
ter Krupa trans. 2014).

THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

162 (Pe-

121. Liz Campbell, CriminalLabels, The European Convention on Human Rights
and the Presumption of Innocence, 76 THE MODERN L. REV. 681 (2013).
122. See PretrialRelease and the Right to be PresumedInnocent:A Handbookon
InternationalLaw Rights to PretrialRelease, LAWYER'S RTS. WATCH CAN. (2013),
http://www.Irwc.org/ws/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Pre-trial-release-and-the-right-tobe-presumed-innocent.pdf; World Report 2015 - Events of 2014, HuM. RTS. WATCH
(2015) https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2015_web.pdf (analyzing pretrial detention practices that amount to state intervention in the privacy and family lives of the

detainees in various countries such as Bolivia, Haiti, Italy, Georgia etc).
123. App. No. 55470/00 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008).
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ance between the means employed and the aim sought to be
achieved. 124
This is a classic example of how the state oversteps its obligation to
enforce criminal justice perhaps to the detriment of its other obligations.
The fair balance that is mentioned in the judgment may even be considered
a valid test against which societal interests and the private interests of the
family may be balanced. The inherent limitations that are associated with a
pretrial detention should not be the sole justification that a state has when
such detentions result in negative repercussions. In the U.S. where it is alleged that pretrial detention is overused, 25 the adoption of the fair balance
test may guarantee that law enforcement authorities and judicial bodies will
mandatorily engage in a balancing act between the implications of a pretrial
detention on the public and private spheres of the lives of the citizens.
Although the fair balance test will not completely be free from its subjective elements, it will serve a useful purpose in helping courts determine
the extent of legality of a pretrial detention. When a detainee (or even a
family member)-raises a question in court regarding the legality of the detention, the court will be obliged to assess whether the prison authorities
have arbitrarily denied the rights to the detainee and the family members.
The development of the jurisprudence in this regard can contribute to the
selection of criteria that will help determine the legality of the actions of the
responsible authorities. While it is premature to determine what components will create the fair balance test, one cannot disregard it before its
efficacy is tried and tested. Arguably, the fair balance test will be able to
strike a balance by applying a set of rules to ascertain whether the detention
and the restriction of rights remain valid or invalid in each case.
C.

When Do Family Members Become Victims?

While it is easier to state that a family member becomes a victim the
moment there is any form of detention irrespective of its legality, the interesting question in this context is at what point family members can be legally recognized as victims. In this regard, analogical references are made
to the decisions of the IACHR, the ECtHR and the HRC's treatment of
matters pertaining to personal liberty in general.

124. Id. 48.
125. See generally OPEN Soc'Y
supra note 6.

FOUNDS.,
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1. Family Members as Indirect Victims
In its 95th Plenary Meeting held on 29th November 1985, the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 26 in the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (the Victims'
Declaration) defines 'victims' as persons "who, individually or collectively,
have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights,
through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws operative
within member states, including those laws proscribing criminal abuse of
power."
On a secondary level, the latter part of the second prong of the definition of victim in the Victim's Declaration is relevant to this discourse. Accordingly, "the term 'victim' also includes, where appropriate, the
immediate family or dependents of the direct victim and persons who have
suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent
27
victimization."'
When the state violates the rights of the detainee, the consequences
befall
the family members are often unintended and the quoted section
that
is in line with the idea that family members can be regarded as indirect
victims of such violations. Terminology that identifies one party as a 'direct
victim' implies that others such as the immediate family members or dependents of the direct victim can be referred to as indirect victims.
The preamble of the Victim's Declaration recognizes that "frequently... families [of victims of crime]... are unjustly subjected to loss,

damage or injury and that they may, in addition, suffer hardship when as128
sisting in the prosecution of offenders."
This highlights the reality on multiple levels. Family members are victimized immediately and, subsequent to unlawful pretrial detention, become
victimized at later stages due to financial struggles that are the ramifications
of loss of income of the direct victim. Moreover, the Victim's Declaration
identifies indirect victims also face challenges when they attempt to assist
the prosecution of offenders. Lack of awareness as to how legal systems
function, how to effectively negotiate with counsel, and the cost and time
associated with such prosecutions can be mentioned as a few examples of
difficulties that the family members have to undergo.
126. Declarationof Basic Principlesof Justicefor Victims of Crime andAbuse of
Power, annex A sec. 1, UN.ORG (Nov. 29, 1985), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/
40/a40r034.htm.
127. Id. § 2.
128. Id.
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The ECtHR recognizes a category of 'indirect victims' and specifically
provides the example of the close family members of a person who is illegally detained. 29 However, it further notes that merely suffering from some
level of discomfort or worry does not qualify one to have a legal basis to
make a claim as an indirect victim before the ECtHR.130 It sets down certain
criteria in order for a family member to be eligible to have locus standi
stating that persons aggrieved should be in a position to indicate that their
suffering "goes beyond what is normal or unavoidable in a case in which a
family member is subject to human rights violations."' 13' This may be critiqued for containing a subjective element as it is not clear what constitutes
'normal' or 'unavoidable.' However, such wording is also essential, as the
unavoidable circumstances, emanating from criminal penalties then would
result in a plethora of claims from all affected parties leading to a standstill
of the law. In other words, a law, which is too broad and does not qualify
the circumstances in which a family member can have a legal claim, may
open up the proverbial floodgates. This quagmire could perhaps be resolved
by applying the standards for determining what constitutes an unlawful pretrial detention and who can claim remedies when such violations occur.
In Kurt v. Turkey, 32 where the applicant's son had disappeared, the
ECtHR unanimously determined there had been a violation of Article 13 of
the ECHR which allows "everyone whose rights and freedoms.

.

.[have

been violated to] have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in
official capacity."' 133 The court was also of the view that when a person has
disappeared, the family member should have an arguable right to compensation, "a thorough and effective investigation leading to the identification
and punishment of those responsible and including effective access for the
relatives for the investigatory procedure."'

34

The significance that a case of

this nature holds in the context of this article is that it sets an international
129. Claim to be a victim: Indirect victim, ECHR-ONLINE (2016), http://echr-on-

line.info/article-34/victim/#Indirectvictim. These members are parents, spouses, and
children, etc. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 373 (1998).

133. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR]; see also Kurt, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep.
71 (Amnesty International, in submitting its views to the courts, referred to the 'severe
mental anguish' that family members suffer in the face of the disappearances of a loved
one. In this context, the anguish suffered by the family members of the detainee becomes a relevant factor).
134. Kurt, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 140.
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precedent for family members to be directly involved when the suffering
they undergo is indirect. Moreover, the legal right that an individual, whose
right to liberty has not been infringed has in exerting pressure on state authorities in obtaining a thorough investigation is highlighted in this case. Its
importance is also prominent in that family members are considered as having such enforceable rights even when the violation has been committed by
an individual acting in official capacity. If such an approach can be adopted
in relation to unlawful pretrial detentions, it may be possible to have a more
favorable stance towards the rights of the family members.
In Qakici v. Turkey, where the brother of a person who allegedly disappeared brought a claim before the ECtHR, the court considered the criteria
that have to be fulfilled by an indirect victim to obtain locus standi in relation to enforced disappearances. The court reaffirmed: "whether a family
member is [an indirect] victim will depend on the existence of special factors which gives the suffering of the applicant a dimension and character
distinct from the emotional distress which may be regarded as inevitably
caused to relatives of a victim of a serious human rights violation."' 135
The elements laid down as necessary for one qualifying as an indirect
victim in the ECtHR are as follows: (a) proximity of the family tie, (b) the
particular circumstances of the relationship, (c)the extent to which the family member witnessed the events in question, (d) the involvement of the
family member in the attempts to obtain information about the disappeared
person, and (e) the way in which the authorities responded to those enquiries. While the final three criteria should be specifically applied to cases of
disappearances, the first two are applicable in claiming that one is an indirect victim with regard to unlawful pretrial detentions. It is noteworthy that
this approach is also compatible with the foregoing analysis pertaining to
the definition of family members in part 2 of this article.
The admissibility of the claims raised by an indirect victim is predominantly dependent on the "nature of the violation alleged and considerations
of the effective implementation of one of the most fundamental provisions
in the Convention system."' 136 In other words, the gravity of the claim
should play an important role in determining the admissibility or inadmissibility of a victim's claim. IACHR too adopts an approach that is similar to
that of ECtHR. Who falls into the category of 'indirect' victims is debatable. However, in a separate opinion in the Case of Ituango Massacres v.
Colombia, Judge Sergio Garcfa Ramfrez explained who an indirect victim
is: 137

135. Cakici v. Turkey, App. No. 23657/94 98 (1999).
136. Fairfield v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24790/04 (2005).
137. Judgement, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148, (Jul. 1, 2006).
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when we refer to an indirect victim, we allude to an individual who
does not suffer this illegal conduct in the same way - immediately,
directly and deliberately - but who also sees his own rights affected
or violated, from the impact on the so- called direct victim. The damage suffered by the indirect victim is an effect of the damage suffered
by the direct victim, but when the violation affects him, he becomes
on the
an injured party himself-rather than by derivation-based
38
Convention and on the rights established therein.
This succinct description explains how and why an indirect victim can
be regarded as having a direct claim. One main argument that can be raised
against the extension of ICCPR rights to family members who bring claims
against unlawful pretrial detentions is that they do not suffer the illegal
conduct directly, and that the consequences that they face are not direct and
deliberate. The above-quoted paragraph responds to this anticipated objection to the extension of rights to indirect victims. It also indicates how the
indirect victim then becomes a direct victim of violation of his or her own
rights thereby justifying his or her claims. The trend in law ought to be the
aspiration to expand its reach for the benefit of many. Therefore, it is correct to argue that a similar approach should be adopted under the ICCPR as
well.
In an alternative light, the International Commission of Jurists opines
that in certain circumstances an individual may be regarded as having a
right to reparation though he or she may not be considered a victim in the
strict sense of the word. 139 Even if one hesitates to accept that family members of the detainee are indirect victims in a semantic sense, the proposition
that such family members are entitled to reparation may be acceptable in a
40
normative sense.
2.

State Obligations to Family Members

Victims' Rights Organizations of the U.S. such as National Crime Victim Law Institute, National Alliance of Victims' Rights Attorneys, National
Organization for Victims' Assistance and National Center for Victims of
Crime are primarily focused on providing rights and remedies to victims of
crime who are incapable of raising a voice for the protection of indirect
victims. However, the mere existence of such organizations cannot guaran138. Id. I 11.
139. See INT'L

COMM'N OF JURISTS, THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY AND REPARATION

33 (2006) (". . in
some cases, while a person is not considered a victim, he or she may nevertheless have
FOR GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE
suffered harm and be entitled to reparation").

140. See infra Section V.
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tee that states will fulfill their duties toward citizens. Although a Declaration does not have the same force of legality as a treaty, it does have some
persuasive power, and in that light, the Victim's Declaration becomes important. It lays down guidelines for states to engage in a self-evaluation of
practices to ensure that the law changes according to societal needs and that
the law is capable of controlling abuses of power. If each state engages in
such self-evaluation, their obligations to the family members will naturally
be fulfilled.
Article 4(c) of the Victim's Declaration calls upon member states of
the United Nations Organization (UNO) to "review periodically their existing legislation and practices in order to ensure responsiveness to changing circumstances, and to enact and enforce legislation proscribing acts that
violate internationally recognized norms relating to human rights, corporate
conduct, and other abuses of power."
Pursuant to the obligations undertaken as members of the UNO, all
state parties have a moral obligation to adjust their laws to cater to the
needs of the modern society. While the Victim's Declaration is not binding
as an international instrument ratified by states, the common goal the Victim's Declaration seeks to achieve is compatible with the broader framework of IHRL to which state parties have agreed specifically by ratifying
treaties such as the ICCPR. Thus, the obligation to periodically review legislation and practices has to be considered an integral aspect of state policy.
The lack of such mechanisms in the U.S. implies that the state's obligation
on behalf of the victims, both direct and indirect, has not been fulfilled.
The Victim's Declaration "is designed to assist Governments and international community" 14 and it is the duty of the states to take measures to
reduce "abuse of economic and political power."' 142 In addition to the general duties of the state outlined above, it is responsible for the commissions
and omissions of its officers that lead to violations of rights. This notion of
vicarious liability is also highlighted in Article 4 (f).143
State obligations to families in general also arise through Article 23 of
the ICCPR as mentioned elsewhere in this article. In GC 19, the HRC recommends that states adopt "legislative, administrative or other measures" to
protect family units.' 44 In this light, the absence of specific mechanisms to
141. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power, supra note 126, [3.
142. Id. pmbl.

143. Id. art. 4(f) ("to promote the observance of codes of conduct and ethical
norms, in particular, international standards, by public servants, including law enforcement, correctional, medical, social service and military personnel as well as the staff of
economic enterprises").
144. ICCPR, Art. 23, Gen. Comment 19, supra note 44 3.
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safeguard the family unit from the negative impact of unlawful pretrial detention connotes the state's abrogation of its duties.
The impact the absence of parents can have on their children is undisputedly immense and the absence caused by unlawful pretrial detention is
tragic. In this sense, the state bears additional responsibilities towards families with minor children and the obligation is much higher especially in
cases where single parents are taken into custody leaving the children unattended or at the mercy of the flawed foster care system. In GC 17 on Article
24, the HRC emphasizes the additional protection mechanisms that should
be implemented for the protection of young children. 45 Hence, this too can
be identified as one situation in which the state bears responsibility for the
protection of the family. 4 6 The overall impression that one gets from evaluating IHRL is that it already contains the provisions that can function as the
premise for establishing enforceable rights for family members of a detainee. Even if other international instruments may not be regarded as being
applicable to the U.S., it being a party to the ICCPR by way of ratification
lays the framework for the impregnable argument that rights and remedies
can be made available to the family members of pretrial detainees by resorting to the provisions of the ICCPR.
V.

A.

RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF THE FAMILY MEMBERS

Overview

In this segment, I present the main argument of the article that family
members who are indirect victims of the consequences of unlawful pretrial
detention ought to be able to raise claims regarding the right(s) to privacy
and family life, and the right to restitution and reparation when they have
suffered losses. It is also argued that in the event family members live in a
territory outside the U.S., they should continue to be treated as coming
within the jurisdictional scope of the U.S. for the purposes of ensuring the
same rights as family members living in the U.S. are entitled to in similar
circumstances. For practical purposes, it is suggested that the rights argued
herein should come into existence upon a case being filed to ascertain the
legality of the pretrial detention. In the event that family members reside
outside the territory of the U.S., compensation can be paid to minimize the
145. Hum. Rts. Comm., CCPR Gen. Comment No. 17: Article 24 (Rts. of the
Child) 1 1, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/I/Rev.I (Apr. 7, 1989).
146. See also Jean Tomkin, Orphans of Justice: In search of the Best Interest of
the Child when a Parentis Imprisoned - A Legal Analysis, QUAKER UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE
(Aug. 2009), http://www.quno.org/sites/default/files/resources/
ENGLISHOrphans%20of%2OJustice.pdf.
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economic and financial loss that the family experiences due to the pretrial
detention. This article neither proposes nor advances a theory to ascertain
the quantum of compensation that ought to be paid but limits its analysis to
the proposition that compensation ought to be paid when a violation of a
right has occurred.
B.

'Hands-OffDoctrine' of the Courts

Prior to determining the nature and extent of the rights that should be
given to family members of a detainee, the courts' 'hands-off' approach
should be examined briefly. In relation to Rehm v. Malcolm147 and Clutch48
ette v. Procunier,1
Professor Klipp argues "there is a lingering judicial
reluctance to become involved in prison reform, despite the waning of the
'hands off doctrine."' 149 Although these cases will not be analyzed in detail
in this context, what matters is the truth it reveals about the judiciary's
reluctance to be directly involved in prison reform. However, in a common
law country, the judiciary can be more closely engaged in promoting human
rights in connection with IHRL.
A judge's duty, though primarily is to interpret and apply the law,
cannot be restricted to a vacuum where decisions will be taken divorced
from socioeconomic or sociopolitical realities. Professor Wiseman contends
in a recent article that electronic monitoring could be adopted in a high
number of cases instead of resorting to pretrial detention. 50 What is more
convincing in his argument is his proposal that such a measure should be
adopted by the judiciary as "electronic monitoring, is not likely to be
adopted by legislative or executive action" although it is a feasible measure
that is in accord with the 8th Amendment's prohibition on excessive bail.151
He makes a case for judicial intervention in that regard by resorting to normative, constitutional and statutory references and responds to some of the
main criticisms that opponents could raise against his proposition. Professor
Wiseman's central argument is also premised on a fair balance approach as
was advocated for in this article. 5 2 According to Professor Wiseman, judicial intervention can function as a check on the encroachment of liberty and
privacy. Although he does not directly refer to the hands-off doctrine of the
147. 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
148. 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
149. Todd L. Klipp, Pre-TrialDetainees Must Be Held Under The Least Restrictive Means Possible To Assure The Detainees' PresenceAt Trial, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.

J. 685, 699 (1974).
150. Wiseman, supra note 119.
151. Id. at 1344.
152. Id. at 1404.
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court, it is evident from his analysis that his approach to altering current
pretrial detention practices is principally dependent on the judiciary performing an active role.
Considering the ground reality that pretrial detention of an individual,
when prolonged and unlawful, has a mammoth impact on family members
as well, it is hardly controversial to propose the judiciary should order the
relevant prison authorities to provide the rights proposed in this article. Several rights proposed in this part, such as the right to conjugal visits and the
right to engage in recreational activities can be made available to detainees
and family members irrespective of the legality of the detention. The main
argument in this respect is that these rights should be made available during
the interim period where the legality of the detention remains in question.
C.

Right(s) to Privacy and Family Life

In recent decades where choice and freedoms have escalated to heights
never before seen, the right to privacy and individual autonomy remain
prominent. Connected to those rights is the right to family life. The underlying arguments of this article indicate how unlawful pretrial detentions (albeit unintended) can have a negative socio-economic impact on family
members and family life of the detainee. Hence, the normative content of
the right(s) to privacy and family life are significant in this context. Although these can be regarded as two separate rights, they will be analyzed
as forming one right within this context. The task of this article is to portray
the rights available to the family members of the detainee in an unlawful
pretrial detention setting. However, it is possible to argue at a secondary
level, that some of these rights can be granted to the family members of the
pretrial detainees even if pretrial detention takes place within the boundaries of due process.
1. Normative Content of Right(s) to Privacy and Family Life
Article 17 (1) of the ICCPR seeks to prevent individuals from being
"subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence." Article 17 (2) creates a right to the protection of
the law against interferences or attacks on family life." When taken together
the sub provisions of Article 17 create both positive and negative duties that
the state should comply with. 53 The normative substance of the provision is
153. See discussion infra Section V.B.2. Compare ECHR, supra note 135, art. 8

(advocating for particularly strict standards that the States have to abide by when interfering with family life, due to the understanding that there are certain State interven-

tions in private and family life, which deny the affected person the possibility of
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easily ascertainable through the General Commentss dealing with the respective provision. The explanations provided by the HRC in GC 16 on the
use of the terms 'unlawful' and 'arbitrary interference' in respect of Article
17 of the ICCPR hold significance in this respect. According to the HRC,
'unlawful' means "no interference can take place except in cases envisaged
by the law."' 154 The phrase 'arbitrary interference' carries a much higher
weight as it is "intended to guarantee that even interference provided for by
law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the
Covenant." 551n other words, this portrays a situation in which a detention
can be regarded unlawful not because the cause of detention is unlawful but
because the process used for the detention remains unlawful.
In paragraph 6 of General Comment 16, the Committee opines that
state reports should contain information on the "the authorities and organs
set up within the legal system [... ]which are competent to authorize interference allowed by the law."' 156 This requires states to regulate how the authorities enforcing law and order interact with the family life of individuals
who are exposed to the law. In light of such regulatory schemes, policy
frameworks such as the 'tough on crime' rhetoric may have to undergo
changes in order to make the domestic law and policy compatible with the
structure of IHRL. In paragraph 7 of the GC, the HRC, commenting on the
relative nature of protection of privacy, calls on states to "indicate in their
reports the laws and regulations that govern authorized interferences with
private life."' 157 This highlights the Committee's understanding of the right
to privacy in connection to family life as a relative concept. However, it
leaves room for wide interpretation that can favorably influence how states
perceive the said right in pretrial contexts. The HRC further emphasizes the
relative nature of the right by advocating for a case-by-case administration
58
of interferences even if the law permits such interferences.
The concluding observations the HRC has drawn with regard to Article 17 show the tendency of the Committee to focus more on administrative
mechanisms, such as wiretapping that is used in violation of privacy, while
other aspects of family life that can be enhanced through the same article
challenging the measures), with ECHR, supra note 135, art. 11 (extending to the protection of family life from "arbitrary or abusive interference").
154. Hum. Rts. Comm., CCPR Gen. Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy) 3, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/I/Rev.9 (Apr. 8, 1988).
155. Id.

4.

156. Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 154,
157. Id. 7.
158. Id. 8.

6.
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remain unelucidated. 159 In Communication No 1890/2009 in the matter between F.K. Baruani and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the author
raised claims under Articles 7, 9 and 17 of the ICCPR as he was arrested by
the Presidential Special Police Department and was held in custody without
charges and was subjected to torture.160 He further claimed he had no contact with his wife and children while he was held in custody and that he was
constantly worried about them. 161 While this ought to have been taken as an
opportunity by the HRC to consider and elaborate on the normative content
of Article 17, it concluded that "having found a violation of Articles 7 and 9
of the Covenant, the Committee will not consider the author's complaint
related to the violation of Article 17 of the Covenant."162This is one instance where the HRC has abandoned an excellent opportunity for ascertaining Article 17's extent of application.
The challenging nature of proving violations of Article 17 is evidenced
also by a communication submitted to the HRC by K.I. Whildy against
Libya, where the author claimed the state has engaged in a violation of the
said Article in relation to his brothers. 63 The author argued that security
forces intruded into the family home and the state party omitted to provide a
remedy thereby violating Article 17.164 The HRC declared the claim pertaining to Article 17 inadmissible purely for reasons of provided information being limited and claims insufficiently substantiated. 165 Although I
have only provided two communications heard by the HRC in connection to
the matter at hand, it is sufficient to substantiate the argument that even the
HRC faces various limitations in its attempt to elaborate the normative content of Articlel7(l), especially in relation to protection from arbitrary and
unlawful interference with family life. While lack of evidence is a permissible reason for the HRC to take a back seat, the dismissive approach adopted
in the Baruanicommunication is not favorable as it abstains from analyzing
Article 17 merely because violations of two other articles were established.
Irrespective of the limitations highlighted above, the right to privacy
and family life in connection with Article 17 (1) can be said to comprise the
following components in all circumstances:
159. IV. Concluding Observations: ICCPR, BAYEFSKY.coM, http://
www.bayefsky.com/themes/pri vacy-concluding-observations.php.
160. Hum. Rts. Comm., Views adopted by the Committee at its 110th session,
2.2-.7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/! 10/D/1890/2009 (Apr. 23, 2014).
161. Id. 2.4.
162. Id. 6.10.
163. Hum. Rts. Comm., Views adopted by the Committee at its 106th session, 1 1,
U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/106/DI1804/2008 (Jan. 25, 2013).
164. Id. 3.6.
165. Id. 6.4.
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(a) Access to justice - Family members of pretrial detainees claiming
that the detention is unlawful ought to be given locus standi under the
domestic legal system and the omission to provide the said remedy
should be considered by the HRC as an autonomous violation of Article 17 (2) of the Covenant.
(b) Communication and interaction with the family - Even when in
detention (pretrial or otherwise) the state party should guarantee the
detainee is authorized to maintain a reasonable level of communication with family members. As per paragraph 8 of GC 16, the level of
communication allowed for each detainee with family members may
be determined on a case-by-case basis. This should also contain the
right to conjugal visits and the right to be able to spend time with the
members of the family. Furthermore, in unions where there are children, the pretrial detainee should be able to interact with children
sufficiently.
(c) Non-Discrimination- Detainees belonging to various social and
economic classes should be treated in relation to their access facilities
to family members on a horizontal equality standard meaning that
discrimination ought not to be committed on any of the prohibited
grounds under the Covenant.
While the normative content of Article 17 (1) with its integrated categories could be much broader than what has been portrayed in this article,
the three composite elements mentioned herein are sufficient to protect privacy and family life from interference in respect of unlawful pretrial
detentions.
2.

Abstinence from Interference and Obligation to Employ Active
Measures

The positive and the negative duties referred to in Section 5.3.1 create
both freedoms and entitlements for family members. It is hardly necessary
to mention there is a wide difference between positive and negative obligations. This could also be identified as an area where domestic politics and
policies pertaining to rights come into direct contact with IHRL. From the
standpoints of finance and accountability in general, it appears that it may
be in the interest of the state to limit rights that have been argued for in this
article to negative rights. The question arises, however, once an indirect
interference has been established, how the obligations of the state should
evolve into positive obligations. The duties and obligations of the state, to
prevent indirect interferences, do not have to be limited to legislative enactments. The common law tradition of the U.S. grants the judiciary many
opportunities to be actively involved in the process of interpreting IHRL
treaties in a manner consistent with the objects and purposes of said treaties.
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In consideration of the multi-dimensional approach of the rights of family
members that are connected to the pretrial detentions of individuals, it is
appropriate for courts to adopt a more comprehensive and active stance in
interpreting the rights. The judiciary can use the active stance recommended
herein to replace the hands-off approach of the court with regard to prison
reforms.
a.

Measures facilitatingconjugal relations between pretrial
detainees and their spouses/partners

A note published by the Michigan Law Review Association as far back
in 1974 contends that authorization of conjugal visits should be a component of a state's positive obligations. The note adopts a different stance than
previously existing literature by deviating from the usual argument that the
denial of such rights constitutes a violation of the 8th Amendment and arguing that "the denial of conjugal visitation is an impermissible intrusion of
the rights of privacy of the married couple involved."' 66 While the focus of
the note remains the conjugal rights of detainees, it interestingly focuses on
67
the application of the right to non-prisoners or pretrial detainees as well.1
Prior to arguing the right of conjugal visitation should be extended to pretrial detainees, the authors consider three arguments that should be countered. The arguments are that (a) courts are incapable of interfering with
prison administration or interfering with prison rules, 68 (b) by committing a
crime, an individual strips him/herself from some constitutional protections, 69 and (c) "a citizen's right to be free of governmental intrusion into
his marriage does not require the state to create special places or programs
in prisons for the private conduct of marital relations."' 170 Admittedly, the
second counterargument has no relevance in pretrial contexts, as the guilt or
innocence of the individual concerned remains undetermined at pretrial
stage. Then the authors move on to analyzing the other two positions. The
authors conclude that pretrial detainees have a strong argument to justify
their claims for conjugal visits based on a strict standard of judicial review
where it will be evaluated whether the denial of the right is requisite, necessary and justified by compelling necessity.' 7' However, this argument is
fraught with inherent limitations as it calls for the application of the right to
166. Notes, Conjugal Visitation Rights and the Appropriate Standardof Judicial
REV. 398, 399 (1974).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 401.
169. Id. at 403.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 405.

Review for Prison Regulations, 73 MICH. L.
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all pretrial detainees irrespective of the legality or the duration of the detention itself. While it is appealing for human rights advocates to accept such a
line of arguments, the administrative difficulties and the pure breadth of
such a measure will necessarily delay the primary goal that this article seeks
to achieve in providing effective remedies to those who are affected by
'unlawful' pretrial detentions.
In light of the fact that only six states currently allow conjugal visits
even to convicted detainees makes the breadth of the argument more an
aspirational argument than a realistic one. 172 The number of states allowing
conjugal visits has decreased from seventeen in 1993 to six in 2015 and the
decline indicates the need for policy modifications in this area.173 Currently,
according to a Program Statement released by the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) in 2003, mother, father, stepparents, foster parents, brothers and
sisters, spouse and children are entitled to family visits. 174 However, the
issue pertaining to conjugal visits remains unresolved, mostly unimplemented and uncategorized as a specific right.
In Rhem v. Malcolm the court argued that "[t]he impact of deprivation
of contact visits, and its psychological importance are real."' 175 The statement of the court shows that it recognizes the importance of contact visits.
Such recognition can pave the way for future recognition of a right that
detainees and family members are entitled to claim. During the proceedings
of the case, Dr. Menninger (psychiatrist and author on prison conditions)
stated "the one great thing that he [the inmate] can look forward to is the
reestablishment, contact, with this world."I 76Although this case only considered the mental health of the detainee in general, the impact that can be
brought through the denial of contact visits applies to all family members
involved. While this approach may appear to be contentious, the family
members, who suffer along with a pretrial detainee, who is by definition
innocent, ought to move the authorities to adopt reasonable measures in
accordance with human rights. The denial of such rights and restricting pretrial detainees to covered booths during their visitation hours is inhuman
and degrading. The court, however, did not elaborate on the advantages that
172. At the time the article was published in the Michigan Law Review, only two
states, Mississippi and California, had laws allowing conjugal visits.
173. See Deborah C. England, States that Allow Conjugal Visits, CRIMINALDEFENSELAWYER (2015), http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/criminal-defense/
state-felony-laws/states-that-allow-conjugal-visits. Currently California, Connecticut,
Washington, New Mexico, New York and Mississippi allow conjugal visits. Id.
174. U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS PROGRAM STMT No. 7331.04
§ 27 (Jan. 31, 2003).
175. 371 F. Supp. 594, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
176. Id.
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the contact visits could bring to both detainees and family members although it seems to have noted the importance of contact visits in an ephemeral manner. In fact, the holding of the case does not return to this issue nor
does it make an enforceable order in that regard. Nevertheless, Dr. Menninger's statements considered and accepted by the court are helpful in determining advantages that can be brought through contact visits to both
family members and the individual detained.
Arguably, it can be stated that the state should authorize prison authorities through legislation to allow conjugal visits to pretrial detainees, at least
when a petition questioning the legality of the detention is pending in a
court of law. One may oppose this proposition on many grounds and it is
beyond the scope of the article to answer such opposition in detail. However, the short explanation to such an anticipated opposition is that justifications can be drawn from two foundations. Firstly, the pretrial detainee is
technically innocent until proven guilty and his or her rights can only be
restricted in exceptional circumstances. This means that he or she is entitled
to general rights including the right to maintain a family life. Secondly,
even if the administration is certain that the individual detained is guilty of
the crime charged, until convicted, the administration does not have the
authority to deny the detainee of his or her rights. Such a denial results in
the violation of the rights of both the pretrial detainee who is technically
innocent and the rights of his/her family members. An added advantage of
compelling and/or encouraging the states to adopt high standards of providing rights to pretrial detainees and their family members could also result in
the reduction of overuse of pretrial detention.
b.

Recreationalopportunities involving family members

In the Program Statement of the DoJ, the U.S. explained its existing
policies regarding recreational facilities in detention facilities. 77 However,
according to the DoJ Statement, "when consistent with institutional security
and good order, pretrial detainees MAY BE allowed the opportunity to participate with CONVICTED INMATES in recreational activities" (emphasis added). 78 This rule ought to be altered in two ways: (a) by making it
mandatory for prison authorities to allow pretrial detainees to engage in
recreational activities, and (b) to promote such activities among family
members of a detainee periodically without encouraging unnecessary interaction between convicted inmates and the pretrial inmates. Bringing together the two categories of prisoners unnecessarily is also contrary to the
177. See generally PROGRAM
178. Id. § 22(a).

STMT.

No. 7331.04, supra note 174.
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first section with which the DoJ Statement begins. Section 1, which explains the purpose and scope of the Statement, seeks to separate pretrial
inmates from convicted inmates.7 9
Section 22 (b) (2) of the Statement of the DoJ creates a minimum
standard to allow pretrial inmates "two hours daily of indoor recreation"
and in accordance with that section, family members can be introduced into
the picture with ease. Allowing the inmate to play indoors with his/her children using board games, read books with their children, or allowing them to
converse with family members with minimum interference by law enforcement officers would be sufficient to satisfy recreational requirements. That
approach will benefit the morale of the family members and the detainee,
and parents would not be separated from their children unnecessarily. By
adopting such standards, the State can fulfill its positive obligations under
Article 17 and 26 of ICCPR. The advantages such measures would bring to
both detainees and their family members are obvious.
According to Epps v. Levine, 80 any limitation of the right of the detainee to engage in recreational activities or visitation rights of the family
member should be justified by a compelling state interest. Considering the
argument that the pretrial detainee remains innocent during the pendency of
the trial, any restriction of access done in excess of the extent to which it is
necessary ought to be regarded as contributing to the 'unlawfulness' of the
detention.
In view of the fact that the jurisprudence on recreation of pretrial detainees, especially recreation opportunities with family members, is still in
its infancy, it is beneficial to examine how the fight to recreation is treated
under similar human rights settings. Although many cases on point are not
available, the ECtHR interpreted Article 3 of ECHR on the prohibition of
torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment as being inclusive of a right
to recreation. 181 In other words, when the authorities prevent a detainee
from enjoying his right to recreation, a court of law can interpret that as
amounting to a violation of Article 3. By analogy, the HRC is in a position
179. Id. § 1; see also id. § 3(a) (according to which pretrial detainees would be

assessed and screened for ascertaining whether they would pose a threat to security or
the orderly running of the institution before permitting pretrial detainees to have regular
contact with convicted inmates).
180. 457 F. Supp. 561 (D. Md.1978).
181. Assenov v. Bulgaria, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 3269 135 (1998) (stating that
when a determination of violation of Article 3 is made, regard should be given to "all
the circumstances, such as the size of the cell and the degree of overcrowding, sanitary
conditions, opportunities for recreation and exercise, medical treatment and supervision
and the prisoner's state of health").
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to apply the same reasoning in matters arising out of the provisions of the
ICCPR.
c.

Rights to restitution and reparation

In this article, the term restitution is used in a dual sense. Firstly, it
refers to the need to 'restore' family relationships that have been affected by
the unlawful pretrial detention. Secondly, it refers to the duty of the state to
pay compensation to the detainee and the family when it is established that
pretrial detention was unnecessary, extensive, cruel, and inhuman and that it
was in violation of the established procedure. State actions or omissions
that result in unlawful detention should be interpreted, for the purposes of
IHRL, as violations of privacy and family life of both detainees and the
family members concerned. This approach, which is justified through the
foregoing analysis, lays the foundation to establish the violation required in
IHRL to enable the granting of compensation where necessary.
The aspects of restitution as a matter of philosophy are generally associated with an ex post facto framework. However, the status quo of the
family life of the pretrial detainee can be maintained through the provision
of conjugal/contact visits and recreation time with family members. It may
not be possible to provide all these rights to all pretrial detainees irrespective of the legality of the detention. Therefore, as a starting point in the
expansion of rights, I argue these rights should be made available with immediate effect from the point in time when the legality of the detention is
questioned in a court of law. Such immediate action is required due to the
sensitive nature of the rights involved as well as the reality that compensation ex post facto is insufficient to remedy damages that may have been
caused to the family during the period of unlawful detention. By adopting
these measures as interim remedies, the state may avoid future liability and
abstain from harming family members further. Moreover, such an approach
helps to provide more rights to the pretrial detainee in addition to the ordinary rights that he or she is generally entitled to.
In the segment on restitution, Victim's Declaration provides that states
should review and reformulate practices to provide restitution as an appropriate remedy and that "offenders or third parties responsible for their behavior should where appropriate, make fair restitution to victims, their
families and dependents." Such guidelines are extremely important in the
unlawful pretrial detention context as law enforcement officers may be liable for unlawfully detaining an individual prior to trial. Its importance is
two-dimensional. Primarily it identifies the state can hold a specific individual liable for the violation of the right in selected situations. On a secondary
level, the offender can be regarded as the relevant institution through which
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the violation of the right occurred. Arguably, the shifting of the blame to the
institution rather than a single individual could be favorable to those who
are seeking restitution and compensation as the institution's capacity to provide restitution may naturally be greater than the capacity of an individual
employed by that institution. However, the flaw in this argument is in the
presumption that the offending individual was acting colore officii. In the
event that his action was solely committed in a private capacity, the legal
threshold that ought to be satisfied to hold the institution liable for restitution is much greater. Article 11 supports the argument made above pertaining to vicarious liability although the Declaration creates direct individual
liability. 182
A surface reading of Article 9 (5) of the ICCPR appears to create a
right for victims of "unlawful arrest(s) and detention(s)" to have "an enforceable right to compensation." The question arises as to who reserves the
right to claim compensation under this provision. It uses the term 'anyone'
and does not restrict its application to detainees. A broad reading of the
provision implies that anyone who can produce evidences in substantiation
of the fact that he or she is a victim in that situation may be eligible for
compensation. The nomenclature employed herein plays a significant role
as it does not limit the right to the individual who is detained. In that regard,
the previous analysis of how family members become victimized in situations of unlawful pretrial detentions is significant. This distinction becomes
much clearer when it is compared with Article 9 (4) which directly addresses the detainee.
In the General Remarks of General Comment 35,183 the Committee
asserts that Article 9 applies to, interalia,police custody and remand detention. 184 This assertion is significant as it lays the foundation for making
claims in the pretrial detention context. Section VI of GC 35 is comprised
of four paragraphs and is on the right to compensation for unlawful or arbitrary arrest or detention. This section does not state that the right to compensation is restricted to the detained individual. While allowing the state to
devise specific procedures for the enforcement of the right to compensation,
182. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power, supra note 126, art. I1 ("Where public officials or other agents acting in an

official or quasi-official capacity have violated national criminal laws, the victims
should receive restitution from the State whose officials or agents were responsible for
the harm inflicted. In cases where the Government under whose authority the victimizing act or omission occurred is no longer in existence, the State or Government successor in title should provide restitution to the victims").
183. Hum. Rts. Comm., General comment No. 35: Article 9 (Liberty and security
of person), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 2014).
184. Id. [ 5.
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the Committee emphasizes that state parties "should establish the legal
framework within which compensation can be afforded to victims, as a matter of enforceable right and not as a matter of grace or discretion."' 185 What
the Committee seeks to encourage in this GC is an effective system which
will provide compensation within a reasonable period. 86 Although states
are not required to provide compensation sua sponte, the Committee anticipates formal procedure that would enable the victims to initiate and commence proceedings for compensation. 8 7 When taken in abstract, General
Comment 35 does not expressly create a right of compensation to family
members. However, neither does it exclude family members as a category.
If family members are regarded as indirect victims, they come within the
scope of paragraph fifty of General Comment 35, which requires states lay
down procedures for the payment of compensation to "victims." The general practice of the HRC is comprised of instances in which it ordered the
state to pay compensation to both the direct victim and the family members.
In Abushaala v. Libya, 188 a case concerning an enforced disappearance, the
HRC ordered the State party under Article 2 (3) to provide "adequate compensation to the author and his parents for the violations suffered as well as
to Abdelmotaleb Abushaala, if he is still alive."' 89 What is important in this
wording is that the Committee does not seem to be implying that compensation has to be restricted to the victim of enforced disappearance if he is
found to be alive. In other words, his being alive does not negate the right
of the family members to receive compensation for the suffering that they
have endured. Nor does it reduce the amount of compensation that the individual who was subject to the direct violation is entitled to. In this case, the
suffering of the family members was purely mental agony as evident from
the facts. However, in other situations of enforced disappearance, the suffering could be spread across a range from emotional to economical.
One of the remarkable explanations in the General Comment is contained in paragraph 51, where the HRC states with reference to Marquez de
Morais v. Angola "the unlawful character of the arrest or detention may
result from violation of domestic law or violation of the Covenant itself,
such as substantively arbitrary detention and detention that violates procedural requirements set out in Article 9."19
185. Id. 50.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Hum. Rts. Comm., Views adopted by the Committee at its 107th session,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/107/D/1913/2009 (June 21, 2013).
189. Id. [8.
190. Hum. Rts. Comm., Views adopted by the Committee at its 83rd session, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/1 128/2002 (Sept. 5, 2002).
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Any detention that falls into the criteria of unlawful pretrial detention
defined in part 2 of this article qualifies to be brought before the HRC when
domestic measures for the enforcement of the right to compensation have
been exhausted. This line of argument can further be extended to include
family members as parties to the action, which enables the court to take the
full family context into account when ascertaining the damage that was
caused to the family due to the unlawfulness of the pretrial detention. For
instance, deterioration of the mental health of the family members requiring
them to incur medical expenditure, financial difficulties faced by the family, etc. can also be considered when determining the quantum of compensation the responsible authority is required to pay.
Senior Legal Advisor of International Commission of Jurists, Matt Polard states, "the consistency across the global and regional treaty systems
[in guaranteeing the right to compensation] suggests that explicit treaty provisions and jurisprudence on compensating reflect an underlying rule of
general international law." 191
Such arguments buttress the proposition propounded in this article that
compensation does not necessarily have to be contingent on domestic law
or even the ICCPR, but that it ought to be considered as a right under customary international law, which states cannot derogate from. This is important in the light of the understanding that the U.S. has added to Article 9 (5).
The understanding states:
[The] right to compensation referred to in Articles 9 (5) and 14 (6)
require the provision of effective and enforceable mechanisms by
which a victim of an unlawful arrest or detention or miscarriage of
justice may seek, and where justified, obtain compensation from either the responsible individual or the appropriate governmental entity. Entitlement to compensation may be subject of the reasonable
92
requirements of domestic law. 1
This understanding can be perceived as a restricted view of justice that
is framed in a way to negate the object and purpose of the Article proper. It
is generally understood that enforcement mechanisms of the Treaties are
subject to domestic law. It is important to pay attention to the wording of
the understanding, which refers to a reasonable requirement as opposed to
mere requirements. While it does indicate that the state will only subject
compensation to reasonable requirements of domestic law, the term 'reasonable' is unreasonably vague by definition. In view of there being no
191. Matt Pollard, Scope of remedies upon a successful challenge to the lawful-

ness of detention, OHCHR (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/
Detention/ConsuItation2014/MatthewPollard.pdf.
192. 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01, T 11(2) (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
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cases at present where family members have been considered victims for
the purpose of being entitled to compensation in the pretrial detention context, it is rather difficult to determine how the state would interpret the
reasonability requirement. At the current juncture, I can only raise questions
as to whether it will be considered a reasonable justification by the state to
deny the right to compensation to family members of a detainee on the
grounds that they did not suffer a direct injury. When this is coupled with
the understanding that the U.S. added to Article I of the CAT to limit the
definition of torture to an individual in the physical custody of the violator,
one may suppose the U.S. will not interpret Article 9 (5) as being a foundation on which compensation should also be paid to the family members of
the detainee in consequences of an unlawful pretrial detention. The addition
of the understanding in this context not only entrenches in writing a fact
which is axiomatic and implied in the text of the ICCPR but also has the
effect of taking the sub-Article in abstract thus invalidating the macro effect
that the Article sought to achieve.
Compensation, thus conceived, has the capacity of serving its full purpose although one must also be mindful of the domestic legislative impediments that one has to overcome in order to make an enforceable claim of
compensation. The situation is further worsened due to the absence of established jurisprudence by the HRC on the issue of compensation. There is
no jurisprudence pertaining to Article 9(5) specifically addressing pretrial
contexts. Analogical reference, however, can be made to the existing
communications.
D.

Rights and Remedies Without Borders

Extraterritorial application of human rights has always been a contentious topic amongst state parties to various international human rights instruments because of complications states face in complying with their
obligations in such matters. Nonetheless, it remains a valuable topic for
analysis especially in cases of unlawful pretrial detention as the detaining
state is concomitantly invoking the legal system of another jurisdiction in
situations where the detainee and his/her family members are nationals of
another state.
While it would be contentious to propose that states should be held
accountable under varying legal systems, rights and remedies that contain
the essence of equality and justice demands that everyone be treated with
equality and equity at all circumstances. In other words, the nationality of
family members or the country of residence should not be a barrier for their
attempts at enforcing their rights. Although the basis of this claim is debatable, there are provisions in IHRL, and Declarations that have been entered
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into by state parties, which by implication promote extraterritorial application of remedies in certain circumstances.
The assumption that underlies this topic is that it is an undue burden to
expect states to provide rights and remedies to non-nationals or to those
residing outside its territory. 93 Examination of this assumption indicates
this concept is linked with the idea that duties and obligations of a state are
inherently tied up with its perception of sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty emanates from the people. 'The people' in this sense are identified
only as the nationals of the state. While I do not promulgate that the basic
notion of what constitutes 'the people' of a state should undergo a radical
conceptual alteration to fit the purposes for which I extend my arguments in
this article, what is thus proposed is that in the field of human rights, the
duties and the obligations of states do not in all situations necessarily have
to be bound to the concept of its sovereignty and its people. This can easily
be substantiated with reference to the undertaking of human rights obligations by states through signing and ratifying IHRL instruments. This enables states to redefine their restrictive notion of 'the people' which is
perceived in light of sovereignty. The ultimate result of this will be the
ability of the state to receive a broader framework of rights and obligations.
This will extend the rights from the narrow scope of rights of nationals to
the rights of human beings. Examining the assumption in this sense reveals
that the ideas generally associated with duties and obligations can be deconstructed in order to reveal the bases on which such notions rest. Such a
deconstruction can then lay the foundation for the expansion of rights,
194
which remain the core hypothesis of this article.
1. General Perceptions of the Extraterritorial Application of Human
Rights Instruments
The actions of a state have an increased capacity of resulting in crossborder consequences in the present day context, which warrants the doctri193. See generally Beth Van Schaack, The United States' Position on the ExtraterritorialApplication of Human Rights Obligation:Now is the Time for Change, 90
INT'L. L. STUD. 20 (2014). Although this is an analysis of the extraterritorial application

of obligations emerging under the body of international humanitarian law, the author
raises interesting arguments which are analogically relevant to the claims that have been
made in this Article. Id.
194. This hypothesis is supported mainly with the concepts of the spiral model
and the impact that slow moving institutions can create on the domestic laws. The
hypothesis is also connected to the modern internationalist argument that draws on
IHRL to justify the broadening of domestic laws to comply with the norms set
internationally.
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nal analysis of the extraterritorial application of human rights. However, the
mere conceptual analysis of the same fails to change the ground realities.
States increasingly continue to guard their conceptions of sovereignty
through the making of reservations and they are reluctant to extend obligations and remedies to territories outside their jurisdiction. Although internal
and external pressure is rising and compelling states to change their stance,
political attitudes regarding the exterritorial reach of rights and remedies
have to be subject to stricter alteration processes. In this respect, one must
put one's faith in the spiral model and the slow-moving institutions to bring
about gradual change.
Some scholars strictly oppose any approach that justifies drawing on
international law to alter domestic law or create new rights within the domestic jurisprudence. 95 Even though this approach portrays a strict formal
interpretation of territorial sovereignty and the resultant authority that a
state receives in connection with it, the formal interpretation of human
rights treaties and declarations indicate a different result through its portrayal of rights as being dependent on inherent humanity rather than on
nationality.
It is thus important to extend the rights to those who are subject to the
jurisdiction of the U.S. rather than limiting the rights to those who are
within the territory of the U.S. In other words, the territorial approach to
human rights should be replaced by the jurisdictional approach to human
rights. While it is possible to argue that such an approach leads to an inclusion of a larger body of people, it is not an unusual or unprecedented
mechanism.
What is directly relevant to the debate pertaining to extraterritoriality
in the U.S. is its interpretation of Article 2 (1) of the ICCPR. Its interpretation greatly differs from that of the interpretation of the HRC. However,
prior to delving in to the debate between the HRC and the U.S. pertaining to
the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR, I will briefly analyze a similar
debate that arose in connection to the IACHR, the American Declaration
and the Body of Principles.
The draft of the ACHR had contained the phrase 'territory and jurisdiction' 196while the adopted ACHR refers only to jurisdiction. 97 Further195. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy of
InternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997).
196. MEDINA, supra note 122, at 8.
197. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights
art. 1, Nov. 21, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 ("The States parties to this
Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to theirjurisdictionthe free and full exercise of those rights
and freedoms..." (emphasis added)).
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more, Medina explains this change as the attempt on the part of states to
"include not only those actions or omissions attributable to state agents as
violations of obligations under the Convention committed or omitted within
State territory, but also responsibility for acts and omissions carried out
outside state territory, but within state jurisdiction." Although Medina restricts her analysis to acts and omissions carried within and without the
territory, one should interpret the term 'jurisdiction' in a much broader
sense than that. In other words, the state should be liable for the impact of
acts and omissions committed within its territory that may transcend the
territorial boundaries yet be within its jurisdictional scope.
The preamble of the ACHR recognizes "the essential rights of the man
are not derived from the fact that he is a national of a certain state, but are
based upon attributes of his human personality." 198This can hence be regarded as one of the primary provisions that would justify the extension of
similar remedies, as has been argued for inthis article, to the family members of the detainee that reside outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.
Furthermore, in the debate pertaining to jurisdiction, many refer to Article 2
of the Convention, which is regarded as the jurisdictional clause. However,
Christina M. Cerna argues this is inappropriate and it is "more accurately
identified as an autonomous substantive rights provision."1 99
Subsequent to establishing the correct jurisdictional clause of the
ACHR, Cerna moves onto a comparative analysis of the exceptions the
ECtHR recognizes to the general principle that the jurisdiction of the states
20 0
is territorial in normal circumstances:
[T]he three exceptions are as follows: (1) the first exception is found
in the Soering line of cases, which held that the European Convention
is violated if lawful acts committed within the territory of a state were
likely to give rise to actual violations outside the state's territory (2)
the second exception is that states are responsible for human rights
violations in territories that are under their "effective control" even if
the territories are outside the state. . . (3) the third exception [is]
where extraterritorial responsibility reached its zenith. . . where
neither the European Court nor Turkey questioned that the Convention applied to Turkish forces operating in Iraq, a state not party to
20 1
the Convention.
198. Id. pmbl.
199. Christina M. Cerna, Out of Bounds? The Approach of the Inter-American
System for the Promotionand Protectionof Human Rights to the ExtraterritorialAppli-

cation of Human Rights Law 2 (Ctr. For Hum. Rts. & Glob. Just., Working Paper No.
06, 2006).
200. Id. at 3.
201. Id.
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She then moves onto an analysis of the Inter American Commission's
work on extraterritorial application. In her analysis, she employs the threeexception approach of the ECtHR and divides the Inter-American Jurisprudence in the following manner: "(1) The Soering line of cases; (2)'effective
control' cases; and (3) cases in which extraterritorial application was not
questioned. ' 20 2 The type of cases she refers to as the 'Soering line of cases'
is what is relevant to this analysis as I am concerned with the impact that
pretrial detention within the U.S. can have on family members who reside
outside the territory. With regard to the ACHR, the U.S. position was that
"the Declaration is not a treaty and [that it] has not acquired binding legal
force." 20 3 Cerna does not expand her arguments pertaining to the first exception beyond this point but in the conclusion, she criticizes the InterAmerican System for not expanding "the jurisdictional envelope much
'2°4
more than the European system has.
As Cerna engaged in a detailed analysis of the 'acts' for which the
state should bear extraterritorial liability, I will only add one clarifying
comment in this regard. State responsibility should extend to both its actions and omissions. In other words, in this context, the state's liability
should be extended beyond its territorial scope when it fails to take cognizance of the rights of the family members that are affected through the
state's failure to prevent unlawful pretrial detention.
2.

Extraterritoriality, ICCPR and the United States

The principles pertaining to extraterritorial application of human rights
instruments have been subject to academic debate over the last few decades,
especially in the aftermath of the 1995 Interpretation of the ICCPR Article
2 (1) by the U.S. Both sides of the debate received considerable attention by
scholars and practitioners alike. But it is safe to argue there is a consensus
in favor of the extraterritorial application of Article 2 (1) outside the U.S. in
select circumstances as is shown in the analysis that follows.
Professor Austen L. Parrish20 5 writes against extraterritoriality of
human rights instruments and points out that scholars writing on the issue
of territoriality can be divided into two categories - (a) sovereigntists, and
202. Id.
203. Report No. 51/96: Decision of the Commission as to the Merits of Case 10/
66 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 1997), http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/96eng/
675,
USA 10675.htm.
204. Cerna, supra note 199, at 16.
205. Dean and James H. Rudy Professor of Law, Indiana University, Maurer
School of Law.
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(b) modern internationalists. 20 6 According to him, sovereigntists are "scholars who are skeptical of - if not hostile to - international law and institutions" and modern internationalists are comprised of a group of scholars
who "reject the sovereigntist thesis and instead herald in international law
as the key means of promoting human and environmental rights.

' 207

In a

comprehensive analysis, he argues "scholars like Curtis Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, Julian Ku, Eric Posner, Jeremy Rabkin, Jed Rubenfeld and John Yoo
are often identified with the sovereigntist movement' while 'Harold Koh
and... Anne-Marie Slaughter are among the most well-known of [modern
internationalist] scholars.

'208

However, Parrish seems to have conveniently

avoided naming all notable scholars who favor a broader approach justifying extraterritorial application. 209 This is perhaps because Parrish sought to
be selective to serve the narrow purposes of his argument that the international law needs to be 'reclaimed' from the threat of extraterritoriality. The
analysis below indicates that current state practice and the position adopted
by international organizations are much broader than the narrow line of
arguments propounded by Parrish.
As pointed out above, Article 2 (1) of the ICCPR is the focal point of
analysis. Article 2 (1) is both regarded as laying down the jurisdiction as
well as establishing equality and non-discrimination. This Article has led to
a considerable debate regarding state obligations that it creates outside the
territory. The U.S. is in the forefront of the debate and has often denied
having extraterritorial liability. Article 2 (1) states "[e]ach State Party to the
present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

' 21 0

This provision functions both as the general obligation clause determining what responsibilities states bear as well as ensuring that such responsibilities are carried out without any discrimination. The debate
revolves around the eight words "within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction." The American debate with the HRC began in 1995 with the interpretation adopted by Mr. Conrad Harper, who was the Legal Advisor of the
206. Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming InternationalLaw from Extraterritoriality,93
L. REV. 815, 817 (2009).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 816-17
209. While he names seven scholars who follow the sovereigntist camp in addition to him, he names only two scholars of the modem internationalist camp.
210. ICCPR, supra note 1.
MINN.
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Department of State from 1993-1996. This interpretation came to be known
as the '1995 Interpretation.'
Two months prior to the adoption of the unwelcome 1995 Interpretation, Professor Theodor Meron published a brief yet influential analysis of
extraterritorial application of human rights treaties which is important in the
present context. 21' Referring to Marc J. Bossuyt's Guide to the "Travaux
Prdparatoires"of the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights,
Meron argues the legislative history of Article 2 (1) "does not support a
narrow territorial construction." ' 21 2 He further quotes with approval, Professor Buergenthal's argument that Article 2(1) should be read to include "all
individuals within its territory [and] to all individuals subject to its jurisdic' 21 3

tion.

Meron points out "this interpretation has almost never been ques-

tioned and has long ceased to be the preserve of scholars; it has obtained the
imprimatur of the Human Rights Committee and UN rapporteurs. ' 2 14 Although Meron favors the notion of the extraterritorial application of the
ICCPR, he argues "not all the provisions of the Political Covenant are by
their nature intended for extraterritorial application. 2 15 However, he includes fundamental provisions, such as the prohibition of the arbitrary taking of life, treatment of prisoners in detention, prohibition of inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment and due process, as the provisions that
21 6
should be treated as having extraterritorial application.
In a very influential passage, Meron argues:
[I]n view of the purposes and objects of the treaties, there is no a
priori reason to limit a state's obligation to restrict human rights to its
national territory. Where agents of state, whether military or civilian,
exercise power and authority (jurisdiction or de facto jurisdiction)
over persons outside national territory, the presumption should be
that the state's obligation to respect the pertinent human rights
217
continues.
The above line of reasoning is also compatible with the VCLT and the
analysis that I have engaged in, in part 3.4.2 of this article. If a state interprets a provision of a treaty in a manner that is incompatible with the objects and purposes of the treaty, IHRL generally considers such an
211. Theodor Meron, ExtraterritorialitY of Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT'L

L.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

78 (1995).
Id. at 79.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 80.
Id.
Id.at 80-81.
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interpretation invalid to the extent that it violates the purposes of the treaty.
The argument the U.S. forwarded in respect of the American Declarationthat it is not legally binding-is not applicable to the ICCPR as the U.S. is a
party to it. Therefore, it is clear that the U.S. is incapable of resorting to that
line of reasoning in connection to the ICCPR. In conclusion, Meron calls
for the bonafide interpretation of human rights treaties by the administration and the courts "in accordance with their object and purpose of promoting human rights, even where such interpretation leads to the
extraterritoriality of humanitarian obligations of the United States. '21 8 What
Meron essentially does through this approach is to encourage the judiciary
to adopt an activist modus operendi when the impact of state actions transcends territorial boundaries.
Two months after the publication of Meron's article, in March 1995,
Conrad Harper stated that the "Covenant was not regarded as having extraterritorial application." 219He further argued "in general where the scope of
application of a treaty was not specified, it was presumed to apply only
within a party's territory.

'220

He sought to restrict the application of Article

2 (1) by emphasizing the word 'and' used in the provision. He contended
that the use of the word 'and' creates a 'dual requirement' restricting "the
scope of the Covenant to persons under United States jurisdiction and
within United States territory."' 22' Mr. Harper referred to the negotiating
history of the ICCPR stating "the words 'within its territory' had been debated and were added by vote, with the clear understanding that such wording would limit the obligations to a party's territory. '222 However, in its
report of the 50th Session, the HRC pointed out:
[It] does not share the view expressed by the [U.S.] Government that
the Covenant lacks extraterritorial reach under all circumstances.
Such a view is contrary to the consistent interpretation of the Com-

mittee on this subject, that in special circumstances, persons may fall
under the subject - matter jurisdiction of a State party even when
223
outside the State's territory.

This clearly reveals the HRC does not view the stance of the U.S.
favorably and that such a restrictive approach has the capacity of being
contrary to the objects and purposes of the ICCPR.
218. Id. at 82.

219. Hum. Rts. Comm., Summary Record of the 1405th Meeting,
CCPR/C/SR.1405 (Apr. 24, 1995).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Rep. of the Hum. Rts. Comm.

20, U.N. Doc.

284, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (Oct. 3, 1995)..

2015-2016]

Justice in Dire Straits

The territoriality debate resurfaced in 2004 with the HRC's adoption
of General Comment 31. In General Comment 31, the HRC noted "a general obligation is imposed on States parties to respect the Covenant rights
and to ensure them to all individuals in their territory and subject to their
jurisdiction. '224 In paragraph 10 of the General Comment, the HRC emphasizes that:
State parties are required by Article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to
ensure the Covenant rights to all persons who may be within their
territory and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction. This means
that a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that
even if not situated within the territory of the State
State party,
225
party.
The HRC has thereby clarified its stance pertaining to the extraterritorial application of the rights found in the ICCPR. When this approach is
applied to the matter at hand, one finds it easy to argue that when a family
member of a detainee establishes a violation of a right, such an individual is
entitled to a remedy disregarding the territorial boundaries. An individual
should only be required to prove a violation of a right has occurred and the
individual comes within the jurisdictional scope of the state that has engaged in such a violation irrespective of living outside U.S. territory.
In General Comment 31, the HRC advances beyond territorial limits
by further affirming "the enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to
citizens of State parties, but must also be available to all individuals regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as asylum seekers, refugees, miin the territory
grant workers, and other persons, who may find ' themselves
226
or subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party.
The above approach indicates the HRC's understanding is not a restrictive approach, which limits the application of the ICCPR to the territory
or the citizens of the state party. Even though it is beyond the scope of this
article to engage in a separate and comprehensive discourse of pretrial detainees who are non-nationals, it suffices to state at this point, similar rights
as the ones that have been argued for in this article are applicable to nonnationals and their families. Such an interpretation is perfectly within the
scope of what the HRC advocates in this respect.
Six years subsequent to issuing GC 31, in 2010, the U.S. Department
of State adopted a somewhat altered stance pertaining to the extraterritorial224. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80] T 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
21/Rev.I/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
225. Id. T 10. Contra Parrish, supra note 206.

226. General Comment No. 31, supra note 224 T 10.
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ity of the ICCPR. 227 In the Memorandum Opinion of the Geographic Scope
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the U.S. Department of State noted:
[T]he 1995 Interpretation has been brought into question by the International Court of Justice... the Human Rights Committee... and a
number of [the U.S.'s] closest allies in their written comments to the
Human Rights Committee. All have taken the considered position contrary to the 1995 Interpretation - that the protections afforded by
2 28
the Covenant do not in all cases stop at the water's edge.
After having noted the concerns raised by the ICJ, the HRC and allies
of the U.S., the Memorandum moves on to an analysis of the U.S.'s current
position. The Memorandum states that after an initial investigation, it was
established:
[T]he 1995 Interpretation overstated the clarity of the text and negotiating history (travaux preparatoire)of the Covenant. Upon fuller
analysis, we found that neither the text nor the travaux of the Covenant requires the extraordinarily strict territorial interpretation that the
United States has asserted regarding the geographic scope of the Covenant - particularly when taking into account the treaty's broader
context and object and purpose, as standard rules of treaty interpreta2
tion require. 29
This is a more favorable position with regard to the extraterritorial
application of the ICCPR provisions although this has not yet been adopted
officially. It also serves the purpose of this article which seeks to encourage
the judiciary and the state to resort to IHRL and apply it to family members
who are affected by unlawful pretrial detentions irrespective of whether
they remain within or without the territory. However, one must note the
visitation rights and recreational rights argued for in this article cannot be
227. The author of this Memorandum is said to be Harold Honju Koh who is
currently Sterling Professor of International Law at Yale Law School. He served as the
Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State from 2009 - 20t3. On EJIL: Talk!, Dr.
Marko Milanovic (Associate Professor at the University of Nottingham School of Law)
states that the 2010 Memorandum was a "leaked document" obtained by a journalist
named Charlie Savage writing for The New York Times. See Marko Milanovic, Harold
Koh 's Legal Opinionson the US Positionon the ExtraterritorialApplication of Human
Rights Treaties, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/harold-kohs-legalopinions-on-the-us-position-on-the-extraterritorial-appl ication-of-human-rights-treaties/
228. U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, MEMORANDUM

OPINION OF THE GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE

OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

229. Id.

3 (Oct. 19, 2010).
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applied to family members residing outside the territory of the U.S. due to
obvious practical reasons. Even though that is a practical constraint, what is
more important is that this analysis paves the way for future scholarship to
advocate for more rights for the family members of the detainee that can be
provided both within and without the U.S. territory.
After the Memorandum Opinion was released to the public in March
2 30
2014, referring to Charlie Savage's News Report in The New York Times,
Dr. Milanovic stated:
If Savage's reporting does prove to be correct and the US now clearly
reiterates before the Committee that the ICCPR cannot apply extraterritorially because its Article 2(1) is supposedly crystal clear and
unambiguous when it says that '[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant,' an important opportunity will have been
231
missed.
It turns out now that both Savage and Milanovic were correct in their
fears that the U.S. would miss 'an important opportunity' in changing its
stance regarding Article 2 (1) of the ICCPR. The U.S. submitted its Fourth
Periodic Report to the HRC in December 2011. This was subsequent to
Harold Koh arguing for a change of stance in the Memorandum Opinion of
the Geographic Scope of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. The Fourth Periodic Report is comprised of 84 paragraphs on Article 2 of the ICCPR, none of which refers to the issue pertaining to the
extraterritorial application of Covenant rights. 232 The U.S. has chosen to
report only on the equality aspect of Article 2, disregarding its territorial
and jurisdictional scope.
In the list of issues that was issued by the HRC to the U.S. on 29 April
2013, the HRC did not specifically raise the question pertaining to the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR. 233 In this regard, the HRC too has
missed an opportunity of questioning the U.S. of its stance pertaining to
territoriality. In its reply, the U.S. strictly adhered to the issues raised by the
230. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Seems Unlikely to Accept that Rights Treaty Applies
to Its Actions Abroad, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/
world/us-seems-unlikely-to-accept-that-rights-treaty-applies-to-its-actionsabroad.html?_r=0.
231. Milanovic, supra note 227.
232. See U.S.
OF AMERICA
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233. See Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 14.
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HRC conveniently avoiding the question regarding the interpretation of Article 2(1 ).234 However, in its Concluding Observations on the Fourth Report
of the United States of America, the HRC condemns the U.S. practice of
continuing to adhere to the 1995 Interpretation. 235 The HRC states that it:
[The HRC] regrets that the State Party continues to maintain the position that the Covenant does not apply with respect to individuals
under its jurisdiction, but outside its territory, despite the interpretation to the contrary of article 2, paragraph I supported by the Committee's established jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of the
International Court of Justice and State practice. 236
As the HRC refers to its jurisprudence in conjunction with that of the
ICJ and state practice, it is possible to argue that there is a rising tendency
to consider rights of the ICCPR apply extraterritorially in certain circumstances. One may note that a customary international norm has arisen in this
regard. As the U.S. has maintained its position as an objector to the extraterritorial application of the provisions of the ICCPR since 1995, it may
attempt to deny the applicability of the customary norm by raising the claim
that it has remained a persistent objector throughout. However, Professor
Jonathan I. Charney 237 has argued in several publications that resorting to
the 'persistent objector' argument may not be considered a very strong justification for not upholding rights and obligations undertaken in the interna238
tional sphere.
Charney argues:
The role of the dissenting State in the development of customary international law is difficult to identify. The positivists clearly held that
no rule of international law could be binding on a State without its
consent. Most modem theories of international law do not require
that express consent be found before a rule of customary international
law can be held to be binding on a State. Many authorities argue that
a State can be bound by a rule of customary international law even
though the State neither expressly nor tacitly consented to the rule. 239
234. Hum. Rts. Comm., Replies of the United States of America to the list of
issues, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/Q/4/Add.1 (July 5, 2013).
235. Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 1.

236. Id. 4.
237. Professor Jonathan I. Charney (late) was the Lee S. and Charles A. Spier
Professor at Vanderbilt University School of Law.
238. See Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent ObjectorRule and the Development
of Customary InternationalLaw, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1985); Jonathan I. Charney,
Universal InternationalLaw, 87 A.J. INT'L L. 529 (1993).
239. Charney, Persistent Objector Rule, supra note 238, at 1.
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Although the extract does not clarify the position that international law
takes when a state has been persistently objecting to a rising norm of customary international law, it establishes the position that a state's express
consent is not required for the establishment of such a norm. It insinuates
that the norm of customary international law can be binding on all states
irrespective of their lack of express or tacit consent. In an article published
eight years after his previous work, Charney argues:
[T]he position gains the objecting State very little. It does not immunize the so-called persistent objector to the pressure that the other
states may impose upon it to conform to the norm. This pressure may
be characterized as merely political, but the alleged legal right of the
persistent objector does not equip that state with any real defenses in
practice. Accordingly, international law allows steps to be taken
against the objector as if it were violating the law. Because international law is one of the legitimate products of the political process, it
is hard to show that the persistent objector gains anything from this
purported status.240

The debates pertaining to extraterritoriality and persistent objector are
not merely academic as they contain very real pragmatic effects on state
parties involved. A trend has arisen among scholars, the HRC, the ICJ,
other international organizations and states to condemn the U.S. position.24 I
It is true that the U.S. does not have a clear record of its human rights
obligations. It is also true that it is difficult and next to impossible to compel a superpower to abide by the international rules especially when the
argument is based on customary international law to which the U.S. considers itself a persistent objector. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that even a
superpower is incapable of existing without being influenced, at least to a
lesser extent, by extraneous circumstances. The pressure has begun to develop within the U.S. as is evident from reactions to Koh's Memorandum of
2010. Hence, it is possible to argue the U.S. will change its stance, either
voluntarily or involuntarily, as the pressure develops both from within and
without.
In the latest Concluding Observation of the HRC on the U.S. Fourth
Periodic Report, the HRC emphasizes:
[The] state party should interpret the Covenant in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their
context, including subsequent practice, and in the light of the object
and purpose of the Covenant, and review its legal position so as to
acknowledge the extraterritorial application of the Covenant under
240. Charney, Universal InternationalLaw, supra note 238, at 539.
241. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 232, at 4.

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

certain circumstances, as outlined, inter alia, in the Committee's
General Comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the242general legal
obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant.
This shows the growing discomfort regarding the U.S. position and the
fact that the HRC considers the 1995 Interpretation to be a malafide interpretation that violates the objects and purposes of the Covenant. Considering the foregoing analysis, it is quite probable that a norm of customary
international law is on the rise, if not already in existence, regarding the
extraterritorial application of the ICCPR in select circumstances. Hence,
one may argue the U.S. will have to succumb to pressure in the future even
though one cannot guarantee at which point of time it would become a
reality. However, it serves the purpose of this article to argue pretrial detention is a situation which comes within the scope of 'select circumstances' in
which the ICCPR should be regarded as having extraterritorial application.
As explained above, this is because the right to life and liberty are considered the most important rights. In that light, it is possible to conclude that
when an unlawful pretrial detainee's family members reside outside the territory of the U.S., they should be provided the rights (in this case compensation) irrespective of the territorial boundaries as they qualify to be

considered as coming within the jurisdiction of the U.S.
E.

'Tough on Crime' Rhetoric and Aphorisms of Justice

Should the U.S. rethink its position on the 'tough on crime' concept?
This question arises because the costs of such an approach seem to have
outweighed its perceived benefits. The number of lives lost through rash
actions of the police, the allegations of racism against the police, the potential for even innocent men and women who happen to become victims of
circumstances to be treated as criminals are but some costs, which come to
mind in association with the rhetoric. However, the 'tough on crime' approach may have an impact on the judiciary in a manner that the society
may not perceive. According to the Open Society Foundation, "[a] conservative judicial attitude to pretrial release and reluctance to conditional
release... may result from concerns that being seen as "soft on crime" will
affect career-aspirations [or they may be based on] perceived pressure from
243
the media and the public.
One may argue such judicial attitudes violate the rights of the family
members. Although it is impossible to instill professional ethics and deco242. Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 100 T 4(a).
243. OPEN SOC'Y JUST. INITIATIVE, IMPROVING PRETRIAL
LAWYERS AND PARALEGALS 36 (2012).
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rum among the members of any professional body including that of the
judiciary, the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges attempts to achieve that
task. In Canon 3, the Code of Conduct states that the judge "should be
faithful to, and maintain professional competence in the law, and should not
be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor or fear of criticism." 244 In the
English case R v. Sussex Justices, Ex Parte McCarthy,2 45 Lord Hewart CJ
famously opined that "it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but manifestly and
undoubtedly seen to be done. '246 That aphorism is universal and cannot be
dismissed as being restrictively applicable to the United Kingdom where
the judgment was delivered. Applying that principle to the pretrial context
would insinuate that judges should be extra cautious of keeping their attitudes in check in order to do justice to matters that come before them.
F.

Recommendations

One of the main causes for the increasing tendency to hold particular
groups of people in pretrial detention may be caused by implicit bias. Just
as strategies are developed in general to make the members of the judiciary
aware of the implicit biases pertaining to race, it is also necessary to identify other factors that can give rise to such biases. A study conducted by the
National Center for State Courts (NCSC) on Race and Ethnic Fairness in
the Courts proposes that the first step lies in the identification of risk factors
such as emotional states, ambiguity, salient social categories, low effort
cognitive processing, distracted or pressured decision-making circumstances and lack of feedback.24 7 Although the specific findings of the study
are irrelevant in this context, the general criteria propounded by it are applicable to the pretrial context as well. Hence, I propose similar mechanisms
should be put in place to help judges avoid implicit biases.
NRCS also suggests that raising awareness of the existence of implicit
biases is important as a stepping-stone towards the elimination of such biases. So long as one refuses to accept the existence of the problem, it is
impossible to address it, as you cannot cure a disease that you are unaware
of. Such unawareness does not prevent harm. Likewise, the dangers of implicit bias harm the society in general. If a judge's decision is contingent on
244. CODE OF CONDUCT
245. [1924] 1 KB 256.
246. Id.
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247. Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias: Strategies to Reduce the Influence of
Implicit Bias, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Files/PDF
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their prospects of career success or on the ease that comes along with affirming a pretrial detention under the pretext of 'protection of the society'
or on societal impact, such a judgment cannot be regarded as appropriate.
Hence, I recommend that societal, economic, political and individual concerns of judges that may impede justice and lead to a spillover effect on
society being empirically studied. Such a study should then lead to the
adoption of a procedure through which judges are educated and assisted in
the process of justice.
CONCLUSION

In an attempt to respond to the question of whether the family members of the detainee should have a claim to a separate set of rights when the
detainee is unlawfully detained in pretrial detention, this article further responds to four related questions: (a) what constitutes an unlawful pretrial
detention and what constitutes a family; (b) when can family members be
considered victims; (c) when do states have obligations towards family
members; and (d) what is the nature of the obligations of the state when the
rights of the family members are implicated.
In this article, I do not propose that pretrial detention be considered
unlawful in its entirety. However, a segment of pretrial detention turns out
to be unlawful as has been shown in the foregoing analysis. This category
has unfortunately become a very large proportion of overall pretrial detentions in the U.S.
The impact created by unlawful pretrial detention is not restricted to
the detainee but extends to family members who can be validly regarded as
victims of unlawful pretrial detention. Although, for purposes of law, they
may be regarded as indirect victims, the victimization that they suffer in
reality is direct. As has been analyzed in this article, the spill-over effects of
pretrial detention far exceeds any benefit that the state may anticipate
through the detention of an individual who has not yet been convicted, especially when the detention transforms into an unlawful measure.
The legal system as it stands today does not provide a proper mechanism by which a detainee, let alone family members, can vindicate the affected rights in a meaningful manner. The spillover effect caused to the
society through the impact of unlawful pretrial detention on family members is an avoidable cost if the legislature adopts direct mechanisms to address the abuses, discriminations and discretions associated with pretrial
detentions.
Once a family member has established an unlawful detention has taken
place and a significant relationship exists between the direct victim and the
family member that entitles the latter to enforceable rights, they should be
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entitled to several basic rights. The basic rights I argue for are the right to
privacy and family life, including the right to conjugal visits and the right to
spend recreational time with the detainee, and finally the right to compensation. The right to compensation is more or less argued for as a right that
arises after a court determines the detention was unlawful. However, the
other rights should be enforced during the interim period when the legality
of the pretrial detention is in question. These rights of family members are
argued for on the presumption that they do not have an adverse effect on the
rights of the pretrial detainee. The nature of the rights discussed herein supplies ample proof that, in fact, these rights are beneficial to both direct and
indirect victims.
Except the right to compensation, the other rights argued for in this
article, can be applied to pretrial detainees and their family members even
when the detention is lawful. In fact, this long-term aspiration underlies the
ideology presented in this article. The proposition that rights and remedies
can be made available to family members of a detainee even if those family
members reside outside the territorial boundaries of the U.S. has been advanced in this article. Due to practical reasons, the right to conjugal visits
and the right to spend recreational time with a detainee cannot be made
available to such parties, although the right to compensation should remain
available despite their extraterritorial residency.
While legal measures alone would not suffice to address the issues
highlighted in the article, it is evident that the law should be used as the
primary norm setting tool in connection with IHRL as it is considered as a
fast-moving institution. Even then, there are challenges to be faced such as
the lack of specific laws addressing the issue or the lack of willingness on
the part of Congress to draft laws specific to pretrial detention. One may
hope there would be lesser or no problems when there are statutes addressing these concerns. However, there are implicit biases or other concerns that
may affect judicial decisions. Such aspects call for reform of judicial practices through non-conventional mechanisms such as awareness-raising programs, training of judges and instilling judicial ethics in them as prejudicial
judicial attitudes contribute to the violation of family members' rights.
The state should interpret laws in a manner favorable to society and
not in a dictatorial draconian fashion. The family unit should be regarded as
the most important unit of society. This warrants the adoption of all measures within state power, to protect the family unit if and when individuals
are subject to pretrial detention. Pretrial detention laws' potential for abuse
should be recognized and remedied with reference to IHRL. To deny family
members their rights by formulating technical interpretations cannot be regarded as a bona fide effort by a state to comply with the norms that it has
undertaken under IHRL. Therefore, the state should attempt to recognize
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the mass-scale denial of rights associated with unlawful pretrial detentions
and adopt measures for its immediate remedy. As Nelson Mandela stated,
"[t]o deny people their human rights is to challenge their very humanity.

24 8

248. Todd McHenry, Carrying on the work of Nelson Mandela, CNN (Jul. 17,
2015), http://www.cnn.com/20 13/12/05/world/iyw-rmandela-charitable-legacy/.

